ABSTRACTS OF THE SCHEDULED PAPERS

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Keynote Lecture

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Keynote Title: Transformation Embodied

Discussions of the connections between Buddhism and social justice rarely focus on the role of women. Comparing various Buddhist, feminist and social justice philosophies, I consider what each can learn from the other. I first analyze the life and work of some of the key female figures in Buddhist philosophy (ancient and contemporary) and then suggest what contemporary feminist philosophers might have to learn from these groundbreaking women and their reception in the tradition. Taking concerns of social justice and feminism seriously requires us to not just think these ideas through, but to act on them -- and so I close by considering their implications for social transformation.

* Bio: Erin McCarthy is Chair and Professor of Philosophy at St. Lawrence University where she also teaches in the Asian Studies Program. A comparative feminist philosopher, in her work and teaching she brings together Japanese philosophy, ethics, feminist and continental philosophy. Author of the book Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood through Continental, Japanese and Feminist Philosophies (Lexington, 2010), her work has been published in several anthologies and journals in both French and English. Her current research looks at medieval Japanese philosopher Dōgen as a resource for contemporary feminist philosophy; early Japanese feminist philosophers; and another strand integrates feminist and contemplative pedagogies. In 2019 Dr. McCarthy was named a Fellow of the Mind and Life Institute. In 2016, she was the recipient of St. Lawrence’s J. Calvin Keene Award and she was an inaugural recipient of the Frederick P. Lenz Foundation Residential Fellowship for Buddhist Studies and American Culture and Values at Naropa University in 2009. In addition, Dr. McCarthy is a trained teacher of Mindfulness for stress management and Mindful Self-Compassion, modalities which she brings to her teaching, the campus community as a whole, and the community in which she lives.
PANELS

PANEL 1: Dialogues with and within Indian Philosophy

Chair: Dimitry Shevchenko, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

A. Raghuramaraju, Indian Institute of Technology, Tirupati, India
  • Comparison with and within Indian philosophies: Reclaiming the contribution of Gauḍapāda

Daniel Raveh, Tel Aviv University, Israel
  • The Art of Dialogue: Revisiting Daya Krishna’s Saṃvād Project

Dor Miller, Tel Aviv University, Israel
  • Daya Krishna and the Goswamis of Vrindavan

Dimitry Shevchenko, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
  • Wilhelm Halbfass and the Purpose of Understanding Indian Philosophy

Encounters between philosophical traditions from distant cultural contexts are fraught with occasions for misunderstanding. Nevertheless, in a genuine dialogic situation, the interlocutors often do discover something about each other. Which conditions are favorable for the arising of understanding in intercultural philosophical dialogue? Our hypothesis is that the local forms of philosophical dialogue may affect intercultural philosophical interactions, thereby obstructing or leading towards mutual understanding. The dialogic strategies in Indian philosophy are relatively well-studied, but not enough attention has been given to interrelations between “inner dialogues” in India and “external dialogues” with non-Indian interlocutors. In this panel, we would like to explore these two types of dialogue, to gain a better insight into the art of cross-cultural understanding.

A. Raghuramaraju will discuss a philosophical comparative method developed by Gauḍapāda (sixth century CE) in respect to Buddhist and Vedāntic traditions. Raghuramaraju argues that Gauḍapāda’s method is a viable alternative to an unequal philosophical approach comparing Indian traditions to Western, but not the other way around.

D. Raveh will deliver a paper on the Saṃvād Project, which was initiated (with others) by the distinguished Indian philosopher Daya Krishna during the 1980’s and brought together traditional Sanskrit philosophers with philosophers trained in Western philosophy. Raveh discusses the Saṃvād Project in relation to the concept of hospitality.

D. Miller will also speak about the Saṃvād Project, focusing on the discussions on bhakti (devotionalism). While the bhakti movement has been historically considered anti-intellectualist, the participants of the Saṃvād Project reexamine devotionalism as a phenomenology of feeling. Miller discusses the "emotive consciousness," in which reason and emotions are inseparable, as reflected in a devotional sentiment.

The topic of D. Shevchenko’s presentation is Wilhelm Halbfass’ “dialogic approach” towards the study of Indian philosophy. Shevchenko discusses the contradiction between the open-endedness of Halbfass’ approach and the methodical purposefulness of philosophical dialogue in India.
Panel 2: The Public Sphere in Indian Philosophy

Chair: Brian Black, Lancaster University, UK

Jessica Frazier, University of Oxford, UK
- Sanvāda: The Rules and Rewards of Public Debate in Classical Hindu Philosophy
- ‘Nevertheless She Persisted’: Women and the Public Sphere in the Mahābhārata

Christopher V. Jones, University of Oxford, UK
- Gossip, Games and Governance: The Public Sphere Represented in Early Buddhist Literature

According to Jürgen Habermas, the public sphere is a physical or imagined space where citizens engage in critical debate to discuss matters of mutual interest. For Habermas, as well as for Charles Taylor and Amartya Sen, the public sphere is a cornerstone for civil society and an open democracy. Recently, Talal Asad has criticised this rather idealised notion of the public sphere, arguing that ‘the public sphere is not simply an open forum for rational debate but an exclusionary space necessarily articulated by power “and everyone who enters it must address power’s disposition of people and things, the dependence of some on the goodwill of others”’ (Formations of the Secular, p. 184).

With these arguments in mind, the papers on this panel will examine a number of sources from ancient India that depict interactive spaces in which proponents of different philosophical schools and/or religious traditions engage in debate with one another. As we examine these episodes we will be looking at where they take place, what modes of shared reasoning are adapted, what power dynamics are described, and what political ideals are supported by them. In attempting to locate and describe ancient India’s equivalent to a ‘public sphere’, this panel will explore ways in which Brahmanical and Buddhist sources can offer new perspectives on how we imagine the public sphere today.
PANEL 3: Raimon Panikkar in Dialogue (Part I)

Chair: Andrew D. Thrasher, Tidewater Community College, Virginia Beach, USA

Milena Carrara, President, Fundació Vivarium Raimon Panikkar, Tavertet, Barcelona, Spain
  • Panikkar and Cassiodorus on Vivarium

Maria Roberta Cappellini, President, Raimon Panikkar Intercultural Centre Italy (CIRPIT)
  • Panikkar and Jung: The Myth between Science and Religion

Paulo Barone, Independent Scholar
  • Panikkar and Jung: From the Circumference to the Centre—The Rhythm of Being in the Mandalas

In this panel featuring Raimon Panikkar (1918-2010), we critically engage in his thought in its extensiveness, complexity, and subtlety. Panikkar unfolded his philosophy in response to, and by addressing, the critical spiritual and intellectual changes that have been taking place in the last century, shaking the foundation of any familiar and established worldview. His ideas touch on such crucial points as "the need for disarmament that must begin with one's heart," "the threat of atomic age," "technology and technocracy," "fragmentation of being and knowledge," "need for mythos to resuscitate the logos," "the sacred present in secularity," "ecosophy," and "the proper understanding of the spiritual meaning of non-theism." His offering for the succor of modern illnesses centers in the recovery of our holistic and radically interrelated vision of the world, which contains the dimensions of the "divine" or the "sacred" (spirituality), the "human" (consciousness), and the "cosmos" (nature, matter). Panikkar observes that this kind of "cosmo-the[0]-anthropic" spirituality has been emerging in the "desert" where the traditional established religions no longer hold any sway over the majority of the modern minds. This triune cosmotheanthropic vision formed and informed the backbone of Panikkar's thinking, which extends to diverse issues concerning human (and all other) existence, social justice, and the question of dignity and the rehabilitation of sanctity of life in the modern technology-ridden world.

Each paper in the two panels deals with Panikkar in dialogue with another significant thinker—Cassiodorus, Jung, Charles Taylor, Tu Weiming, and Nishida Kitarō, to be precise—all of whom in one way or another ventured onto the uncharted waters in their intellectual pursuits and established their own unique systems of thought.

By engaging Panikkar in dialogue with another thinker in this way, not only does it put into practice Panikkar's own method of "dialogical dialogue," but also something new seems to emerge concerning our understanding of Panikkar's thought and that of the dialogue partner, as in such "dialogical dialogue," both persons shed light on each other. By approaching Panikkar with a critical eye in this "comparative" manner, it seems that the lasting implication of Panikkar's thought in our time is more clearly delineated.
PANEL 4: Raimon Panikkar in Dialogue (Part II)

Chair: Milena Carrara, President, Fundació Vivarium Raimon Panikkar, Tavertet, Barcelona, Spain

Andrew D. Thrasher, Tidewater Community College, Virginia Beach, USA
- Panikkar and Charles Taylor on the Re-Enchantment of Secular Experience

Ursula King, Institute for Advanced Studies, University of Bristol, UK
- A Comparison between Raimon Panikkar’s cosmotheandrisism and Teilhard de Chardin’s worldview as cosmic, human and divine

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PANEL 5: Understanding the Vocabulary of Emotions

Organizers: Maria Heim and Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad

Douglas Cairns, University of Edinburgh, UK
- Shame, respect, and the interaction of esteem and self-esteem

Maria Heim, Amherst College, USA
- Shame and Shyness"

Maddalena Italia, SOAS, UK
- ‘Love’ in Sanskrit poetry: between universality and untranslatability

Curie Virag, University of Edinburgh, UK
- Attending to reality: drawing the conceptual map of emotions in early China

Moderator & Respondent: Chakravarthi RAM-PRASAD, Lancaster University, UK

"Emotion" and current English words for emotions are hardly universal categories as we know from the rich and complex accounts of the phenomena of human experience in the world's classical traditions that offer substantial alternatives to them. Even within traditions, emotion terms do not remain stable and fixed, and vary from context to context. This panel asks conceptual and philosophical questions about emotions as they occur in the work of translation and cross-cultural understanding, and considers these questions across Chinese, Indian, and Western classical traditions. We ask, what is the conceptual work particular terminology does in specific contexts, discourses, and genres? How can we convey such specificity as well as find comparative analogues for such terminology in other languages? What choices do we make as we seek shared conceptual ground? What are the philosophical entailments of such choices?

We offer a multicultural philosophical presentation on what we may learn about emotions from philological and translation practice. The panel will also demonstrate the methodological challenges that face us in bringing classical texts into contemporary discourse.
In his study of the modern idea of nature, Ronald Brady observes that the respective approaches of biology and physics were originally separated by an “ocean” that has since disappeared (“The Idea of Nature,” p. 90). Since that time biology has taken on the reductive, mechanistic approach of the physical sciences, just as our ability to see the difference between organic and merely physical phenomena has eroded. Similarly, I argue that, prior to the scientific revolution, Indian and Western philosophies of nature were separated by an ocean of difference that has since disappeared (or at least, disappeared too much). Moreover, our failure to notice the discrepancies between the two is directly related to the felt need to conform to the criteria of modern science. This paper explores the parallels between these two ocean-crossings—the first involving biology and physics, the second Indian and Western philosophies of nature—as not just historical coincidences but coordinated expressions of a growing philosophical attitude that sought to divest its (scientific experimental, colonial, text-artefactual) object of study of vitality and reduce it to an object of control. It takes as a case study the relatively recent history of interpreting the classical Indian philosophical text, the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. Standard readings of this text are dominated by the modern scientific attitude, though a select few readings (mostly Kantian-based) offer a critical alternative. Through a brief treatment of Western renderings of the Sāṃkhya category, “vyaktaprakṛti” (lit. “manifest procreativity”), as “nature,” juxtaposed against its Kantian-informed translations, this paper looks to recuperate “vyaktaprakṛti” as “nature” while avoiding the pitfalls of a modern biological reading. To this end, I turn to Goethe’s formulation of nature as “vital nature” (natura naturans). Goethe directly observed both biology’s transformation into a modern science and Kant’s resistance to this development. His theory of “vital nature” is not only more suitable for disclosing Sāṃkhya as a philosophy of natural life, Goethe explicitly presented it as a critique of, on the one hand, the modern biological view of nature as natura naturata (“nature already created” or lit., “nature natured”), and on the other hand, the Kantian view that nature could not be known in-itself.
**Rethinking Mozi’s Jian’ai (兼愛)**

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Mozi’s doctrine of impartial care (jian’ai 兼愛) has been interpreted predominantly through the lens of Mengzi: i.e. as “love without distinctions” vs. “love with distinctions.” However, I think Mengzi saw only half of the picture, since his focus was exclusively on the difference between Confucianism and Mohism in regard to the scope, intensity, and sequence of love. In this paper, I argue that Mozi’s impartial care is also characteristically different in kind: i.e., as “care without love” vs. “care with love.” My analysis and comparison of their usage of the word ai 愛 shows that Mozi’s ai is material-based care, while Confucian ai is emotion-based care. Mozi’s impartial care exhorts us to take care of other people regardless of our feelings toward them.

Several prominent scholars already have argued for something like this reading of Mozi’s jian’ai: for example, A. C. Graham interpreted Mozi’s ai as an “unemotional will to benefit people and dislike of harming them” (1989, 41). Benjamin Schwartz interpreted it as “an outwardly oriented disposition of mind which focuses wholly on achieving the benefits of others” (1985, 147). However, this unemotional character of Mozi’s ai has not been fully examined. Accordingly, in this paper I examine why Mozi had this particular understanding of care and argue that this is largely because Mozi held a negative view of human emotions. For him, emotions are not a reliable source to prompt us to practice care to others, and emotions are also harmful because they tend to shrink the scope of our care to others.
Upakāra: The Concept of Assistance in Akalaṅka’s Tattvārthavārtika

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In the sūtras 5.17–22 of his Tattvārthasūtra Umāsvāti lists various kinds of assistance (upakāra) in the production of certain effects that the six basic types of substances provide. Dharma and adharma respectively support motion and rest, ākāśa acts as a receptacle, pudgalas support the body, speech, mind, breath, pleasure, pain, life and death, jīvas support one another and kāla assists continuity, transformation, activity and posteriority and priority. In his commentary to the sūtras Akalaṅka explains each case of assistance in detail, elucidating the relation between substances, their assisting functions and the effects the production of which they assist. He emphasises that the assisting function of each particular type of substance cannot be performed by any factor other than itself and that substances can never lose the inherent capacity to assist in their specific ways even in the absence of recipients of their assistance. In their assisting functions substances participate in the causal relations that bring about some of the most elementary worldly phenomena, which means that upakāras are vital factors to consider when exploring Jaina metaphysics.

Despite that upakāras have received only scarce scholarly attention. Secondary sources mostly refer to them in terms of substances functioning as auxiliary causes of particular effects but do not offer much detail beyond comparing them to specific auxiliary causes like water, earth, shade of a tree, potter’s wheel etc. This paper will investigate Akalaṅka’s account of the different kinds of upakāras, identifying their distinguishing characteristics and examining the causal dynamics that are involved in their operation. It will, further, analyse Akalaṅka’s engagement with alternative views on the topic. Since Tattvārthavārtika was influenced by Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi, it will be read against the latter in order to explore which of Akalaṅka’s explanations and arguments with regard to the different upakāras follow his predecessor and which are novel in the Digambara Tattvārthasūtra commentarial enterprise.
Comparing Ancient Traditions on the Elements of the Self

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The elements of Plato’s tripartite soul, which exist within individuals but also inform the social stratification of producers/warriors/rulers in the Republic, correspond strikingly to the three qualities (gunas) of the personality in the Samkhya and early Buddhist traditions: tamas, the appetites & ignorance; rajas, emotion & desire to dominate; and sattva, the rational faculty, or purity. In Eastern thought too, the human being is a microcosm—not of political reality but of metaphysical reality: All three gunas are present in states of consciousness, as they are in nature and life. To what extent do the gunas function like Plato’s divisions of the soul? Is Plato’s project--engineering a society so that a different primary quality is dominant in each of three societal groups--compatible with Eastern understanding of how the gunas function?

In contrasting Plato’s parts of the psyche with the gunas, I will focus on Plato’s decision to ban poetry from the Republic. Plato clearly believed it was possible to change the tripartite structure of one’s soul. This is why he carefully specified each social level’s ideal education and what influences should be eliminated—and why he endorsed the noble lie. Similarly, according to eastern philosophy, influences such as one’s environment, lifestyle, or even foods eaten, can increase or decrease the gunas. But does eastern thought agree with Plato on how experiencing art or poetry affects the interplay of one’s fundamental personality traits? Does good art enhance wisdom or diminish it? Pablo Picasso famously stated that art is a lie that reveals the truth. What kinds of truths does art reveal, and what effect do these revelations have on the guna composition of its audience? What specific sorts of creative outputs was Plato wary of and why? Can the gunas help us understand if his wariness is justified?
Abortion in Watsujian Ethics: An Argument for A New Understanding

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Watsuji Tetsurō says ethics is not a matter of individual consciousness; rather, it rests in the betweenness that exists between individuals and communities. Thus it is unsurprising that he offers no universal moral formula like a categorical imperative or utility principle, which construe ethics as a series of puzzles for individual moral agents to solve. But without any overarching principles, it is hard to see how Watsuji’s ethics amount to anything instructive for the individuals engaged in perpetual creative tension with their communities. Without such guidance, his project is arguably not ethics but metaethics.

My aim in this paper is to distill something of his ethics from his metaethics. I take up abortion as a starting point, to offer a new understanding of both Watsuji’s ethics and the abortion debate. In volume two of his Rinrigaku, he envisions the family as the smallest of social units—in effect a single ningen—and identifies a brand of selfless solicitude (korporozukai) as one of the central virtues of an ethical existence in a local community. This by itself is not clearly permissive or impermissive of reproductive rights, but it does give a locus for the mizuko kuyō rites often performed following an abortion or miscarriage. Here solicitude for the lost fetus (mizuko) is a loving maternal act, not private and shameful but public and therapeutic.

I couple this with Watsuji’s ethics of authenticity, which suggests a broadly permissive position on reproductive rights: fully actualized ningen ought to behave selflessly and harmoniously but also ought not to be repressed by the state. The ramification for the broader debate is that taken together, the two principles imply that anti-abortionists who characterize women seeking abortions as selfish, or as isolated moral agents abstracted from family and community, misunderstand the issue at its most basic level.
The “Contact Improv” Approach to Cross-Cultural Philosophy

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In cross-cultural philosophy, we have seen some key methodologies: the comparative approach that seeks conceptual similarities and differences, critical and postcolonial investigations that expose power structures between East and West, hermeneutic situatedness that maps intellectual horizons, and now a more decolonial, dialogical reciprocity. These methodologies stand with two feet on a dichotomous relationship between East and West. They suggest that we are somehow achieving a dialectic, increasingly mature perspective on cross-cultural interaction. Our field is now buzzing loudly with our terms – hermeneutic, critical, global, postcolonial, dialogical, intersectional, cross-, multi-, pan-, trans- and so much more – and this jargon is becoming a self-referential sound barrier, for students and scholars alike.

The actual experience of cross-cultural existence is much more complex – not linear but dynamic, not just interpretive but also performative, not just cerebral but embodied, and not just dialogic but transformative. To illustrate this movement, it is helpful to borrow from an unlikely partner - Dance. “Contact Improv” is a dance form in which two bodies are in constant contact with each other at some physical point. Their situatedness in their bodies and the “horizon” of their previous dance training may dictate their aesthetic, but the dance occurs at their point of contact, where each dancer’s movement is at once the impetus and the result of the other’s move. They are both agents and outcomes of their constant transformation. In their dynamic dance, at times they may imitate or contrast each other (comparative), at another moment one may overpower the other (critical/postcolonial), the other can surprisingly emerge from underneath (subversive); at times, they may be in perfect balance (dialogical), or support each other’s soaring flight (collaborative); at other moments, they may discover that because of their partner they are innovating their own aesthetic (transformative). All these moments (and methodological approaches) are freeze frames in the continuous dance that is neither linear nor circular; it is dynamic. Their interactions may move between raw and controlled, abrupt and flowing, conflicting and reciprocal, but these are recurring phases of the reactions they evoke from each other. The dance is not set in the vocabulary of one tradition; it is an improvisational, transformative exploration arising out of their point of contact.

The purpose of this cross-disciplinary visual analogy is this: first it will invigorate and energize our methodological jargon and prove to be an effective, sensory, pedagogical tool for our students who can get lost in theoretical abstractions; second, it is a deliberate move from a floating cerebral notion of consciousness to a more embodied one; and third, it is an aesthetic, joyous, and empowering solution to the serious, ethical burden of our multicultural existence.
A Comparative Analysis of Death in Light of the Views of Brentano and Early Daoism

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Brentano distinguished mental from physical phenomena by arguing that the objects of the former are characterized by their ‘intentional inexistence’, while physical phenomena possess nothing like it. Saying that the (intentional) object of a mental event has ‘inexistence’ is to say that it exists in the mind and not in the physical world, although one’s experience may be of, or about physical events. In short, all experience — from sensory perception, dreaming or waking experiences of any kind, to the most complex form of reflective thought — exists in the domain of mental phenomena instead of the ‘actual’ de facto world of physical phenomena. Since the focus of Brentano’s thesis is on the subject who experiences objects in so many ways, a major concern about death that may arise is that it stands to irreversibly take that experience away. By contrast, for early Daoism we are subjects of life instead of subjects of objects. Ultimately we are subjects of Dao, which both the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi characterize as the source and sustainer of all things — all phenomena and beyond. Most importantly, all things, including life and death, are seen as essentially interrelated instead of having an independent (e.g., self) existence. I show how the basic assumptions expressed by Brentano and the early Daoists about what is real, lead to very different ideas about who we are, and what life and death is.
The ontological breach in the Zhuangzi’s subject

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In this essay I would like to present relation between the subject and the self in the Zhuangzi. My aim is to show the paradigm of the self from the philosophical and psychological perspective. In this “alternative” reading, the subject is present in the negative form. The statements which deny the subject (for example I have lost me -吾丧我） become paradoxically a claims about his ontology. The problem which I want to discuss here is strictly speaking the process of "becoming" of the subject in relation to the self, the movement in which the subject emerges by his own negation and how this process is understood.

What the subject exactly means when we read in the text : “the Consummate Person has no fixed identity, the Spirit Man has no particular merit, the Sage has no one name.” (Ziporyn, 2009). Is it possible to talk here about ontological break?
Does Understanding Need Language? Silence and Language in Heidegger and Classical Daoism

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This paper examines the relation between understanding and silence. At first glance, both Heidegger and the classical Daoism of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi seem to advocate silence as a way of being, superior to that of speech or any other use of language. It therefore seems that those who understand are silent, and those who do not understand have to resort to language. This paper challenges such a facile understanding of both Heidegger and Daoism, and argues that although some form of silence may be a stage of understanding, it is in the end not sufficient. In other words, although language needs to be overcome by silence, it is silence itself which then needs to be overcome by language again to arrive at a full(-er) understanding of the world and our place in it. I challenge the idea therefore that silence is the endpoint of understanding, and seek to prove that ‘real’ understanding consists in an awareness of the necessity of using language, as well as the awareness that our ‘normal’ ways of using language are insufficiently suited to such real understanding. Not only do we need language to come to understand that silence should follow such ‘normal’ language, but we also need another kind of language to understand what this silence actually does for us. And it is understanding through that other language that Heidegger and Daoism seek to convey.
Sextus Empiricus, Nāgārjuna, Zhuangzi, and the Context-Sensitivity of Belief

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I have recently defended a view of belief as context-sensitive: in any given context, there is a set of "live" possibilities; to believe that \( p \) relative to such a context is to rule out all live not-\( p \) possibilities. For example, in higher stakes contexts, one tends to take more possibilities seriously, and so to believe fewer things.

This view has met with the following sort of objection. Even granting that people often allow non-rational contextual factors to influence what we believe, nevertheless epistemologists should not model belief as sensitive to such factors. We can always identify a privileged context which characterises an agent's real beliefs. Using the example above: higher stakes tend to make us think more carefully, to examine our presuppositions; what one really believes is what one believes when one's thinking is maximally careful.

I offer three countermodels: belief states recommended on rational grounds, with no such maximally careful context. These three models take inspiration, respectively, from Sextus Empiricus, Nāgārjuna, and Zhuangzi, and they diverge in increasingly radical ways from the objector's vision of rational belief states.

Sextus, wanting sceptics to be able to suspend belief on any question, can be reconstructed as requiring that, for any \( p \), one can always reach (by means of the modes) a context where one does not believe \( p \). This requirement is incompatible with having a maximally careful context. Nāgārjuna's thesislessness and his teaching of universal emptiness suggests a picture according to which we may have beliefs about conventional reality (explicated as beliefs bearing substantive presuppositions) but we should not believe anything to be ultimately true.

Finally, we can read into Zhuangzi's attack on all distinctions into categories in the Qiwulun a recommendation against the whole procedure of ruling out one possibility in favour of another.
Zhuangzi and the Limits of Human Knowledge

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This paper argues that the Zhuangzi offers valuable contributions to epistemology, specifically in clarifying the compatibility of objectivity with what I call “species relativism” (‘SpR’). SpR says that it is unfounded to favour human points of view to the conflicting points of view other animals have on the same things. Long before Thomas Nagel, the Zhuangzi queried why we take the impressions of individual humans to be more revealing of reality than those of e.g. fish, insects or reptiles (if not of bats). It is true that the possibility of accessing a god’s eye or “heavenly” view of reality, such that we could see the world as a unified whole, is a prospect which the Zhuangzi is sceptical about. Nevertheless, like Nagel, the Zhuangzi does not take the impossibility of accessing this full picture of reality to be sufficient grounds to abandon inquiry altogether. Rather, both suggest that recognizing the limitations of our apprehension of reality, qua humans, is a powerful insight along the road to absolute truth. Though we can never fully “overcome” our partiality, we can strive for, and achieve, a more objective view of the world.

I first briefly consider Nagel’s View From Nowhere, and then propose an alternative picture in terms of a View from Everywhere, consistent with my interpretation of the Zhuangzi. This absolute view is from a multiplicity of perspectives, and thereby assumes that perspectives are ineliminable from reality. I then argue that thought experiments involving (non-human) animals in the Zhuangzi play a central role in establishing such a picture, and powerfully problematize humans’ pretensions to reach the world absolutely. Finally, I suggest that the Zhuangzian sage is itself a kind of thought experiment, which conveys what it would be like to see the world from everywhere, if it were possible to do so.
Early Gaṅḍīya Vaiṣṇava theologians (15th and 16th c.) claimed devotion (bhakti) to Kṛṣṇa is the only means needed to become free from naturally occurring mental states and actions that have been widely viewed as critical soteriological impediments among Indian traditions for the last two thousand plus years. These include how we conceive of ourselves in relation to the psychophysical complex of our body; our subjective sense of self that arises in relation to our body; the feelings of attachment and desires we develop for the things of the world; and our mental and physical actions (karma) that these and related mental states spur into motion, leading to various enjoyments and, invariably and more acutely, various kinds of suffering (duḥkha). Generally attributed to a primordial misapprehension (avidyā) of our intrinsic nature (or lack thereof in most Buddhist contexts) in which we mistake the psychophysical complex of our body to be our self (ātman; puruṣa), these mental states and actions serve to keep us existentially trapped (baddha) in a cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (samsāra) in which identify with various kinds of bodies relative to our previous actions. A great deal of scholarship has examined the philosophical and historical influences that informed early Gaṅḍīya Vaiṣṇava views on the liberating power of devotion and the hermeneutical strategies they employed to justify these views (Haberman, 1988; Gupta, 2007, 2016; Holdrege, 2015). Very little research, however, has looked at why the practices of devotion they advocated would, if at all, be effective for bringing about soteriologically desirable changes to these mental states and actions in light of scientific research in cognition and behavior. Drawing on cognitive theories of learning and scientific research in the psychological sciences, I argue a central reason these practices would be effective is because of the ways in which they help one internalize the Gaṅḍīya Vaiṣṇava worldview.
A salient endeavor of postcolonial Anglophone Indian philosophies has been to seek reconciliation of different viewpoints and worldviews that appear contradictory with each other. To understand contradictory entities as forming a compatible unity requires a methodological analysis of alternative models accounting for plural and simultaneous truth-claims. In order to reach a metaphilosophical level that enables us to realize truths, philosophers such as Kalidas Bhattacharyya, J. N. Chubb, and Daya Krishna use terms such as ‘witness or sak.in attitude’, ‘super-philosophic attitude of neutral transcendence to any standpoint’, ‘contemplation’, and ‘intellectual detachment’. These concepts indicate a demand for cultivating a metaphilosophical standpoint from where a self-luminous awareness of the plurality of claims and truth-statements can originate. Such a practice indicates how understanding requires an attitude of introspection in order to reach out for alternative viewpoints and worldviews. Understanding epistemological claims in this sense implies to realize the beliefs that underlie any philosophical theory. These beliefs orientate the logical argumentation which they constitute. To look within ourselves to realize our beliefs and other presuppositions appears to be a necessity to understand other theories with different truth-claims. In my talk, I want to explore the insights of these philosophers to highlight how such a metaphilosophical level of inner awareness of plurality can help de-centre ‘understanding’ from its hermeneutic presuppositions. This implies to open up the concept for practices of inner awareness that enable contradictory truth-claims. It operates however from within philosophy, namely as a contribution to epistemological models that can accommodate further dimensions of ‘understanding’ in order to account for the diversity of philosophies.
Feminist scholarship is a modern globalized theoretical project, which is produced in the West and then internationalized in various parts of the world. Global economic institutions seem to privilege Western cultures and political norms, presenting them as models for the rest of the world; consequently, the claims of women’s and indigenous movements in the global South are ignored and marginalized, which results in discursive colonization. In this paper, I argue that internationalization of feminist scholarship calls for empowerment within discursive colonization. I situate feminist epistemology within globalization and transnationalism, exploring how feminist knowledge is produced in both local and global context. Transnational flows of scholarly feminist knowledge production circulate between and through educational institutions such as transnational publishing and scholarly conferences. In demonstrating power relations in gender knowledge production, I focus on the gender discourse in China, in particular internationalization and related politics of Chinese feminist scholarship to rethink transnational feminism that is becoming a normative feminist discourse. For instance, the “gender” concept is a useful analytic tool, but it becomes a universal and normalized (Western) concept in Chinese feminist scholarship. Under the Western eyes, Chinese feminist scholarship tends to be either Westernized or self-Orientalized, which shows how knowledge and related power is used and abused when feminist scholarship travels across national borders. The politics of feminist knowledge production in globalization makes it necessary to reflect on cultural politics of globalization from the perspective of feminist philosophy. Tracing the links between power and knowledge in transnational feminist paradigm, I look at how transnational perspectives shape the ways in which gender knowledge is produced, consumed, and disseminated.
The Art of Understanding Nishida for People with Learning Difficulties

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Nishida Kitaro’s philosophy is hard to understand even for persons with a normal intellect. Only if one dives into the thoughts of Nishida by reading his texts very carefully, can it be understood. However, his philosophy is full of rich wisdom and inspiring thoughts. Why should it be restricted to readers or students with an over-average intellect? In German, we have had a new phenomenon in this area – translations from “normal” German into “plain German”. It uses very short sentences. In English, this kind of language is called plain language.

The background of plain language is the principle of “being barrier-free” which is a phrase normally used only for wheelchair friendly buildings. Plain language wants to be intellectually barrier-free.

The principles of plain language are among others:
- Only short positive sentences are used. They should be in the active form.
- Each sentence contains one statement.
- Conditionals like “would be” are avoided.
- Quantities are described as much, many or little, few or “a long time ago”.

In German, there is a dictionary called Hurraki for German words translated into plain German.

Two examples of entries:
“Philosopher = a philosopher is a human being
A philosopher tries to find answers to important questions. Philosophers think about various things.
For example:
- what is the meaning of life
- why are we here on this world
- what is the human being
(...)

Religion = Religion means that people believe in a special power.
People who believe in a religion are called religious.
Mostly religious people believe in a god. (...)
Religion helps people to understand the world.
In a religion, there are a lot of personal questions.
For example, the question about the meaning of life.
Or the question what happens after death.
Often, these questions are directed at a super human power, for example, at a God.
In philosophy, this is exactly the opposite.
Philosophy answers questions with human reason and logic. (...)

With the help of a certified translator for “plain German language” (i.e. she translates from normal German into plain German), I would like to find out if the task of at least summarizing Nishida’s thoughts in plain language is feasible.
To know the sound (知音): how names arise from the unnamed in the excavated cosmological texts

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In the Warring States period philosophical and cosmological texts (such as, Heng Xian, Xunzi, Laozi, Shen Buhai, Hanfeizi, Zhuangzi), much attention is given to names and the process of naming. Names are seen as deeply involved in the world’s becoming, and the process of naming as a major way of imposing order and harmony on it. The common denominator of these texts is the newly found ability to rise above language and reflect its functions from an independent point of view. For the first time, the question how the names arise is being posed.

The presentation will illustrate the double role of names in the excavated texts Heng Xian and Tai yi sheng shui: on the one hand, they are arbitrary and get fixed by their shared use, on the other hand, they seem to arise from the world itself, through ‘sound’ yin音. In an ideally empty and silent mind, the sound comes before words and words are only adjusted to it. It is also the criterion by which some words are found more fitting than other. Knowing without words is then described as the ultimate knowledge.
Giving as Abandoning: Generosity in Śāntideva’s Bodhisattva Manuals

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This paper explores the conception of generosity (dāna) that the 8th century Indian Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva develops in his moral thought. In particular, I focus on Śāntideva’s equation of giving (dāna) with abandoning (tyāga) in his bodhisattva manuals. For Śāntideva, generosity is a mental attitude of renunciation of all possessions; it does not require giving any physical item away. It is therefore private, in the sense that it does not depend on direct interaction with any person, and likewise immediate altruistic impact is not one of its success conditions. Nevertheless, it remains giving in an intuitively plausible sense, in that one abandons/gives everything to sentient beings in general. It is radical, in that one gives away/abandons everything. Ordinarily giving can be difficult and dangerous, but once any sense of self has been abandoned, one can give anything with ease. Therefore, giving for Śāntideva is a self-protective and self-beneficial virtue.
**Ars Contextualis in the Expansive Learning 《大学》: Mapping Plurisingular Roots of Belonging beyond Rigid Designators of Identity**

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The core Confucian classic the *Expansive Learning* (*Daxue 大学*) elaborates a pragmatist oriented project of "extending knowledge through vital appreciation" (*gewu zhizhi 格物致知*) that spirals—centrifugally and centripetally—through processes of harmoniously integrating persons, families, states and nature in ever expanding webs of meaningful entanglement. I will be developing a reading of the *Expansive Learning* that is non-foundationalist and anti-individualist and that seeks correlative continuity from the most encompassing and expansive realms of global value (*tianxia 天下*) to the most focused and intensive projects of somaesthetic cultivation (*xiushen 修身*). In addition to contextualizing the *Expansive Learning* in discursive fields of philosophically resonant texts only recently unearthed in various archeological discoveries such as the *Guodian* corpus, I will also be providing a creative philosophical reconstruction of the concept of "resolute agency" (*shendu 慎独*) that is optimally situated in a dynamic conceptual scheme of situations, processes, and events rather than in any static framework of substances, essences, and objects. It will be argued that a focus-field dynamic is the key to understanding the *ars contextualis* project of finding optimizing harmony in concentric circles of vital relationality—an ethical-aesthetic project that the early Confucians simply call "expanding knowledge through vital appreciation." Not only will the importance of comparative metaphysics be considered in thinking through the entangled and mutually entailing realms of vital relationality, but issues in the philosophy of language, especially in terms of deep grammar, will be given careful consideration. The inadequacy of thinking about reference and meaning in terms of rigid designation (fixed conceptual schema and modally invariant objects) will be shown and instead a generative ritual grammar grounded in embodied moral imagination and always provisional narratives occurring within in intergenerational communities of ethical-aesthetic inquiry will be offered. The aim is that such a reading of the *Expansive Learning* will not just be of Sinological interest, but will contribute to a much needed global paradigm shift in thinking about persons and values beyond what is currently offered by the related paradigms of virulently exclusive ethno-nationalist internationalism (particularly of the liberal proceduralist variety) and regnant political ideologies of possessive individualism.
Zhuangzi and Wittgenstein: Language Games and Liberation in the Inner Chapters

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There is little doubt that the Zhuāngzi’s 莊子 attitude towards language is complex and multifaceted. Zhuāngzi scholarship often focuses on establishing a singular theory of language in the text, and then using this theory to determine ethical consequences. This essay attempts a different approach: this essay uses Wittgenstein’s concept of language games to explore different attitudes to language and the consequences of those attitudes in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuāngzi. This continues my earlier explorations into the moral psychology of the Zhuāngzi. In the theme of this conference, this essay focuses on the arts of communication in the Inner Chapters, and the therapeutic treatment of the fixed heart-mind (chéngxīn 成心) with the language of play.

The first half of this essay compares the thought of Zhuāngzi in the Inner Chapters and the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations. Both the Philosophical Investigations and the Inner Chapters distrust singular, reductionist theories of meaning. Both recognize a pragmatic element in language. Both recognize that usage varies depending on circumstances and intentions. This sympathetic spirit suggests Wittgenstein’s concept of language games may serve as a useful lens to discuss the multiple uses of language in the Inner Chapters.

The second half of this essay discusses two distinctly different language games in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuāngzi: the strategy of usefulness (yòng 用) and the strategy of play (yóu 遊). The strategy of usefulness carves the world into discrete objects, reducing objects into definitions, and emphasizing the utility of objects for satisfying given teleological ends. The strategy of play employs a variety of linguistic tools to treat the problems of the fixed heart-mind. Surprise, confusion, and humor permeate the inner chapters. These strategies—which encompass their own forms of language games—suspend the heart-mind’s distinctions and fixations. This aporetic moment helps open the heart-mind to a more complex relationship with knowledge and nature. In this opening, the language of wandering liberates the heart-mind from fixed meaning and nurtures the moral psychology of the wandering heart-mind (yóuxīn 遊心).
Bringing Practice to Theory: Experiential Learning in (non-Western) Philosophy Courses

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This paper begins with a brief survey of recent trends toward increased public philosophy, which can trace its current popularity to Pierre Hadot’s *Philosophy as a Way of Life*. I summarize the most common arguments in favor of this approach, including the purported benefit to the individuals who participate, to society more generally, and to the long-term viability of the discipline of philosophy. I argue that such benefits of public philosophy accrue at least as much to the study of non-Western as to Western philosophies.

In the second part of the paper I identify a variety of reasons to doubt whether public philosophy can deliver the sort of benefits its advocates claim, raising both pedagogical concerns and doubts about the benefits to the profession. I then point out that most concerns—of either sort—are best understood as iterations of “that’s not real philosophy.” Consequently, the most powerful response to these concerns involves articulating an inclusive notion of philosophy, acknowledging that there is no one thing that constitutes “real” philosophy. I then argue that, because those of us working in non-Western philosophy are generally already familiar with making such arguments about the nature of philosophy, we are particularly well-prepared to defend the practice of public philosophy against its (actual and potential) critics.

I conclude my presentation by arguing that the pedagogical objections can be met even if one is disinclined to a more inclusive definition of philosophy. In support of this argument, I present assignments that I have used in my non-Western philosophy classes to demonstrate that philosophy can be taught as a way of life while also helping students to improve on such skills as close reading, rigorous argumentation, and careful writing. Indeed, I argue, whatever distinct benefit students may gain from studying non-Western philosophy, such benefit is greater when it involves well-designed experiential learning components than when it follows a more traditional lecture–discussion–essay-writing format.
This thesis looks at the methods prescribed by Daoist and Zen Buddhist philosophies for overcoming egoistic behaviour in order to relieve suffering and achieve ideal living, whilst avoiding many of the potential pitfalls associated with western epistemology. The dualistic epistemology we have inherited from our tradition involves perceiving reality as occurring on a linear timeline as a continuing interaction between the separately existing subject and the independent objects of reality. This separation is assumed to be so in western science and philosophy, arguably without any such basis in direct experience.

I will argue that Daoism and Zen Buddhism share a critical view of what we ordinarily understand as knowledge, and make similar recommendations as to an alternative approach. This similarity, I believe, is based on their shared non-dualist framework and their mutual appeal to unmediated ways of knowing. This non-dual underpinning is evidenced by direct inquiry into experience and such evidence offers a cornerstone by which the teachings of these traditions can be correctly interpreted and thus consolidated. I will also argue that both traditions place emphasis on unprincipled knowing as an antidote to the complications caused by over-dependence on dualistic knowledge and the shortcomings of western epistemological presuppositions. Methods prescribed by both Daoism and Zen Buddhism involve at their core non-dual insight and include meditation and intimate language as ways to inquire directly into the nature of reality.

'Learning By Unlearning' involves inquiring directly into reality, without the overshadow of analytical reasoning or learned knowledge. With such a direct observation of reality, in contrast to both a priori deduction, and a posteriori reasoning, the distinction between subject and object is seen as vague or non-existent, and all phenomena are realised to be interdependent and without form. This marks a distinction between experience as ordinarily and interpretatively understood, and direct or unmediated experience.
Wang Yangming’s conception of heart-mind

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In this paper, I focus on the late thought of Wang Yangming. By examining Wang’s *Doctrine in the Four Axioms* (*siju jiao 四句教*), I analyze the intellectual achievement that has made him such an influential thinker: Wang put forth a synthesis between the major schools of thought of his time (two schools of Neo-Confucianism, as well as Daoism and Buddhism). In the first section, I show that the third sentence in the *Doctrine* demonstrates that philosophy of Wang can be traced back to *Mencius*. In the second section, based on one problem left from *Mencius*, I introduce the debate between Wang Yangming and Zhu Xi (1130-1200) over *gewu* 格物 in the *Great Learning*. Based on the fourth sentence in the *Doctrine*, Wang’s reading of *gewu*, which he rephrased under the phrase “extending one’s pure knowing to the utmost” (*zhiliangzhi* 致良知), synthesized between Zhu and Lu (1139-93). My purpose in this paper is to challenge the distinction that previous scholars have made between the Lu-Wang school, associated with Wang and Lu and the Cheng-Zhu school. But instead of jettisoning the foregoing distinction, I offer several lines of criticisms to show that it is misleading to place Wang in opposition to Zhu. Lastly, I explain the first sentence of the *Doctrine*, arguing that the influence of Chan Buddhism is what made Wang move away from *Mencius*. Indeed, a comprehensive treatment of Wang’s work in general and his views on the concept of heart-mind in particular would have to discuss the influence of Buddhism in detail. However, given the limited scope of the present work, I will not be able to do so here, and will only offer brief comments.
Some Kantian Resonances to the Moral Relevance of Chinese Art

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In this paper, I examine the efficacy of projecting Kant’s, and Schiller’s somewhat modified Kantian, philosophy of aesthetic autonomy and views on the moral relevance of art into a classical Chinese context. Firstly, Kant distinguishes aesthetic freedom and moral freedom, while it is interesting to note that aesthetic freedom and moral freedom are united by the pursuit of the mind being in accord with the Dao in the classical Chinese artistic context. The detached mental freedom experienced by classical Chinese artists is compatible with Kant’s aesthetic freedom, and the moral freedom fulfilled through art is endorsed by the Confucian sincerity which is analogous to Kant’s good will. Schiller’s view of internalised inclination as conforming to moral duty and cultivated through art shows a parallel with the classical Chinese view of moral sentiments that are conditioned by the sincere will and may be fulfilled through art. Secondly, concerning that an aesthetic community may promote a moral community, there are differences behind the parallel between classical Chinese aesthetics and Kant’s philosophy. For Kant, an aesthetic community may indirectly trigger a moral community. In the context of classical Chinese art, an aesthetic community more directly contributes to the establishment of a moral community, since in the process of appreciating the work, the viewer’s mind is stimulated to echo the painter’s mind, and his moral elevation may be conducted simultaneously. Regarding the morally significant aesthetic community, Schiller’s account of aesthetic education offers closer parallels with the classical Chinese ideas, even though in the latter context the attuned souls or kindred minds are united under the law of qiyunshengdong and the sincere will engages in aesthetic contemplation and congenial spiritual communion.
Immersive Ecstasy - Freediving as an Art of Understanding

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“The true man of old slept without dreaming and woke without anxiety. His food was plain, and his breath was deep. For the breath of the true man rose up from his heels while the breath of the common men rises from their throats.” Zhuangzi

This presentation explores the world of freediving or apnea –underwater breath-holding and diving– as a concurrently personal and communitarian path to flourishing. The underlying epistemic commitment is that understanding, truth, and wisdom are best cultivated perspectivally. Much as Zhuangzi (1968), Ortega y Gasset (2004), and Nietzsche (1966) did. These three luminaries also had pertinent embodied commitments regarding our cognition and abilities that expeditiously align with contemporary enactive views (Gallagher 2017) and comparative versions thereof (Ilundáin-Agurruza 2016).

Etymologically, to “understand” derives from standing in the midst of, whereas “art” concerns skills that result from learning and practice. As such, an artistic cultivation of understanding happens in the midst of immersive engagements. Among these, the aquatic world is uniquely revealing on several fronts. It affords a transactional and comparative assessment of breathing in terms of pneuma and qi (Billeter 2010), and of the virtuosic development of our skills (Hershock 1996). It also takes place in the midst of a fertile environmental tension between welcoming embrace and menacing hostility: we develop in a liquid environment before birth but afterward drown under water. Yet, precisely from such tension and risky situations freediving offers both an ecstatic stance that displaces us outside of ourselves and an immersive experience that fully envelops us. Such risky businesses –philosophical perspectivism and apnea– open opportunities for flourishing as we learn to commune with the environment (Brymer & Gray 2009) and others.

Indicative Bibliography
Mastering the Situation:
Situationist Problems for Confucian and Aristotelian (Virtue) Ethics

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This project is an analysis of the situationist problems in virtue ethics, as put forth by Owen Flanagan, Gilbert Harman, and Doris and Stich, and its theoretical implications for two well established and highly studied theories of (virtue) ethics— the Aristotelian and Confucian. While the project does briefly cover the debate over whether Confucian ethics should be considered a variation of virtue ethics, the project seeks to understand to what extent Confucian ethics is affected by situationist problems. The project first introduces the situationist problem in moral philosophy, as put forth initially by Owen Flanagan (1991) then developed further by Gilbert Harman (1999) and Doris and Stich (2005). After a brief introduction of the problems and surrounding debates, the project seeks to apply this problem to Confucian (virtue) ethics. Throughout the 20th century, several experiments were done in psychology that, when interpreted by the above philosophers, helped to build the situationist position criticizing Aristotelian virtue ethics. This project similarly applies these interpretations to Confucian ethics to see how far the same criticisms can be made for this approach, and to what extent this approach may have anticipated such problems. By doing this we see that that the Confucian approach tends to avoid the pitfalls of the Aristotelian approach by favoring a method of individual flourishing that takes into consideration the agent’s unique psychology and relational identity, and puts less stress upon objective criteria for character building. The project then poses the question of whether or not theoretical issues of character building may be avoided in Aristotelian virtue ethics, the same way they are avoided in Confucian virtue ethics, and to what extent the Confucian approach may be informative for the Aristotelian approach to virtue ethics. The project concludes by noting that the Confucian approach to virtue ethics may inform the Aristotelian approach in ways that help it to avoid the situationist critique, but at the cost of having to rework substantial parts of Aristotelian ethical theory.

Keywords: traits, character building, virtue, situationism, moral psychology
Phenomenological perspective of Bernhard Waldenfels, the author of *Phenomenology of the Alien* (Germ. *Topographie des Fremden*, 1997), will be used to reconsider dualist metaphysics of the classical Śāṅkhya and Patañjali’s yoga psychology. I will specify the basic assumptions of Waldenfels’ theory by defining the categories of *alterity* and *alienness* which are regarded as the crucial factors conditioning the domain of intersubjectivity. In my paper, however, I argue that this genuine phenomenological discourse may be also applied to intrasubjective domain. The complex domain of subjectivity captured in terms of Śāṅkhya-yoga philosophy is marked by the experience of the inner alien. It involves inner duality of the self, namely objectless consciousness (*puruṣa*) never to be objectified nor perceived, and on the other hand, the empirical ego, or the embodied thinking faculty (*citta*, *antarākṣaraṇa*). This splitting up is recognized as the root cause of ignorance (*avidyā*) and all mundane suffering (*duḥkha*). Bifurcation of subjectivity into the empirical “I” and the transcendental true self results in questioning the pertinence of direct self-understanding and favours transgression of the current self-image. As I demonstrate in my paper, according to the authors of Śāṅkhya-kārikā (4th c.) and *Yoga-sūtra* (circa 3rd c.) continuous efforts to challenge one’s self-identification ultimately aims at accepting the inevitable alienness of the core subjectivity. A gradual process of de-identification is regarded in Śāṅkhya-yoga as the necessary condition of cognitive and spiritual self-development. The paper is concluded with the comparative remarks on the role and significance of the “alien” both in inter- and intrasubjective domains.
The Emptiness of Autonomy

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In Adventures of Ideas, Alfred North Whitehead reached a conclusion that has been held by Madhyamika Buddhists since Nāgārjuna: that desirous attachment to ideas—even good ideas like the Four Noble Truths—is ultimately destructive. Whitehead describes this attachment in terms of civilization at large, and Buddhists in terms of individuals. Ideals that once served civilizations can begin to undermine those same civilizations. In process philosophy, ideas emerge out of specific, relational contexts in which those ideas play specific purposes. As contexts change, the ideas do as well – often in subtle ways that are lost on those who hold those ideas to be static, unchanging ideals. Ancient Greece, Whitehead argues, became attached to its ideal notions and stopped growing, adapting, and changing. Buddhist literature abounds with stories of students who become too attached to particular ideas and explanations. In this paper, I will try to apply this general idea in a critique of culture. I will claim that large portions of Western civilization have become attached to at least one such set of ideas: the notions of individual freedom, autonomy, and responsibility. This attachment, while productive in the past, is gradually leading to more problems. Many have seized upon these ideas as unchanging Platonic ideals of a perfect society, and a panacea for all personal and societal problems. In order for society to grow, these ideas must be expanded, adapted, and changed.
The Philosophy of Shu(恕) and its Meaning in the Age of Digital Culture

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Digital culture is the mainstay of life in modern society. Although our lives in digital society have improved in convenience, our selfishness has become prevalent as we put personal rights ahead. The warm relationships between people and people are dwindling, and in self-centered thinking, respect and consideration for others are weakening. Now we need to look back on what a person is and what a good life is, an ideal life, and a happy life. Although there are many philosophies of both East and West, Confucianism considers the good virtue as the essence of human being. Ren(仁) stands for humanity. Ren(仁) is the foundation of 'humanity'. Confucius and Mencius advocated the practice of love based on Ren(仁) and proposed Shu(恕) as a method of practice. This Shu(恕) has both a passive and an active side. Shu(恕), which contains the mind of attention, respect, understanding, learning, and concessions to others, is the channel through which our love in our hearts flows. The modern people who lead their lives here and now create a new law or creed to solve various problem situations and run a committee. But even though it may be a method of external coercion or a method of producing temporary utility, it is difficult to secure the durability as much as the heart of love from within a person. Therefore, we need to actively implement the spirit of Shu(恕), which contains the mind of concern, respect, understanding, caring and concessions to solve various problems in modern society. Encouraging the use of Shu(恕) in education at the social level or cultivating individual moral mind will help overcome conflict and antagonism and open the landscape of concord and harmony.
Watsuji, *aidagara*, and intentionality as reciprocity

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Tetsurō Watsuji has not received the same level of attention from comparative philosophers in the west as have other Kyoto School luminaries like Nishida and Nishitani. But this is starting to change. Recent work has argued for Watsuji’s ongoing relevance to, among other things, current debates about environmental ethics, the self, care ethics, political philosophy, and phenomenological approaches to embodiment and intersubjectivity. I continue this trend.

Focusing primarily on *Rinrigaku*, I draw attention to an aspect of Watsuji’s thinking that has yet to receive much attention: his discussion of intentionality. I argue that as part of his general phenomenological analysis of embodiment, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity, Watsuji develops a rich — and novel — picture of intentionality that advances, in substantive ways, approaches found in Husserl and Heidegger, both of whom directly influenced Watsuji. Specifically, I bring into focus Watsuji’s characterization of “intentionality as reciprocity”, as I term it. This characterization is found in arguments Watsuji gives for the social character of intentionality: the idea that both the character and content of our intentional relations with the world are, in various ways and at multiple levels, regulated by forms of “betweenness” (*aidagara*) that are distinctive of our sociocultural milieu. After unpacking Watsuji’s notion of *aidagara*, I develop this reading by looking at a number of cases studies Watsuji provides, including his analysis of desire and his discussion of perceptual consciousness, and I consider how *aidagara* relates to Watsuji’s analysis of the anticipatory structure of intentionality. Along the way, I draw upon empirical work to further develop Watsuji’s view, including work in developmental psychology and vision science. And I conclude by showing how Watsuji’s analysis can make useful contributions to a number of areas, including phenomenological investigations of self-disturbances in schizophrenia.
Understanding Classical Islamic Sexuality: Between Ibn ‘Arabî and Rûmî

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The publication of volume 4 of Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* (2018) opens up new possibilities for the study of sexuality, beyond the conventional hermeneutic and psychoanalytical approaches that seek the inner or biological core of sexuality. According to Foucault, there is a long-term continuity in the Western experience of sexuality, in terms of (inner, and often hidden) desire and a truth to be brought out by confessional rituals, carried out under pastors or psychoanalysts. He contrasts this with pagan Greek antiquity, and with the Indian, Chinese, and Islamic traditions, where, he argues, sexuality is experienced in terms of pleasure and self-control.

Although one may criticize the Orientalism implicit in this overly schematic binary opposition, it is a useful starting point. In my presentation, I will discuss the mystical strains in the classical Islamic experience(s) of sexuality, focusing on the writings of Ibn ‘Arabî and Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî. Although one finds clear references to the (ultimately Pythagorean) tradition that views sex in terms of physical and moral well-being, one also finds in them a mystical sacralization of sexuality, which is also remarkably tolerant of deviant forms of sex. These mystics’ experience of sex is also very different from modern Islamic conceptions and norms of sexuality.

My argument also ties in with recent discussions of the hermeneutics of Islam, in particular Shahab Ahmed’s influential 2016 argument that ‘the Islamic tradition’ should not be understood primarily in terms of religious orthodoxy, but in terms of a tradition which encompassed philosophical and literary expressions as much as strictly religious ones, and which was not only accommodative of, but in fact constituted by, contradiction. The same holds, I will argue, for (sexual) transgression.

**Literature**

Michel Foucault, *Les Aveux de la chair*. Paris, 2018
A Pitfall in Confucian Virtue Ethics

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Recent studies in characterizing Confucian ethics as virtue ethics seem to often overlook inseparable dimensions in Confucianism between the ethical and the political, and the private and the public; as a consequence Confucian self-cultivation is seen merely as a quest for fulfilling a flourishing life on a personal level. However, it misses a very important aspect of Confucianism, namely the political nature of Confucian ethics. In a Confucian world, personal cultivation enables one to become a noble person (*junzi*, 군자), which, in turn, endows him an enormous political power. On the other hand, a petty person (*xiaoren*, 소인) who lacks the Confucian self-cultivation in varying degrees is readily denounced as “the enemy of virtue.”

In this presentation, I’d like to examine the contrast between noble and petty person from one of its earliest examples to Korean neo-Confucian one, and in so doing, it will, I hope, show the problematic aspect of Confucian version of virtue ethics, which haunts it from the beginning.
1. Ecological Space - time of Chinese Philosophy

Chinese philosophy is the representative of oriental thinking. This organic whole world view comes from a completely closed region. Geographically, the east is the Pacific Ocean, the south belongs to the jungle mountain and also connects to the Pacific Ocean, leading to the Indian Ocean, the west is the Qinghai - Tibet Plateau, the north is the nomadic area of the Mongolian Plateau, and the northwest is the Gobi Desert. In such a closed area, the Changjiang River and the Yellow River are rushing along as mother rivers that nurture Chinese civilization. Fertile land is the basis for self-sufficiency in farming, and the sanctity of land is the root of survival in the Chinese mind. The Love of nature makes the Chinese understand to adapt to the weather and understand that people live between heaven and earth. The idea of the organic whole of heaven, earth and man has always been the foundation of Chinese philosophy, and organic holism has always been carried out.

2. Philosophy of Organic Integrity

Chinese philosophers have their own unique language to expound the unity and integrity of nature. “Tao”, “Qi” and “Jing” are the basic philosophical thoughts about the whole in ancient China. “Tao” is the unified law of the intrinsic nature of all things in the universe, and “Tao” refers to the principle of integrity.

The “Tao” reflects the whole, which is a dynamic whole, a unity of difference and diversity. “one Yin and one Yang is called Tao”, which means a dynamic mechanism. In Tao Te Ching, “The Tao gives birth to one, life to two, two to three, and three to everything.” “Tao” commands all things, which is a theoretical interpretation of the integrity of the natural ecosystem in Chinese philosophy.

“Tao” implies the unity of time and space. The “Tao” of “born in nature” is summed up as space and time, which says: there is a mixture of things and born in nature. Such a thing, which exists before the heavens and the earth and generates everything in the heavens and the earth, will not change forever, will not stop running and will not see the beginning or the end. All these say that “Tao” has infinite meaning of time and space.

Taoist thought contains the view of relativity of time. Taoists call it “Heaven has one day and the world has ten years”, it reflects that Taoism already has the idea of relativity about time.

“Tao Qi Theory” is a theory that studies the principle of ecosystem integrity. “Tao” is the oriental language of cosmology. “Primordial Qi” is a philosophical concept in ancient China, referring to the primitive matter that produced and constituted the universe.

Confucianism believes that the universe is a life system and is formed by the generation of life. That is, in the Book of Changes, “the great virtue of heaven and earth is born”. Chinese folk proverbs also say, “Heaven has a virtue of good living”. Confucius, the founder of Confucianism, has a deep respect for heaven, but he does not think that heaven is god. The unity of man and nature recognizes the significance of life in nature.

3. Ecological Interpretation of Nature in Chinese Philosophy

Yin and Yang Theory is the core of China's theoretical system. Sun is Yang and month is Yin. With the theoretical extension of the concept of Yin and Yang, “Yin and Yang” has become a universal concept to explain all phenomena and describe all differences (heterogeneity). The universe, heaven and earth, men and women, up and down, large and small, light and shade, cold and hot, etc., they are all classified according to the theory of Yin and Yang. All positive, open, dynamic and enthusiastic phenomena belong to Yang, on the contrary, all negative, closed, static and calm phenomena belong to Yin. In short, all things and phenomena can be divided into Yin and Yang. This is to say that everything has two sides which are contrary and are the unity of opposites, this is the
basis of the organic philosophy of the East. The “Five Elements Theory” and the “Eight Diagrams Theory” are both systems and applications of the “Yin and Yang Theory”.

The theory of Yin and Yang directly relates to the ecological effect of balance and stability. Whether it is nature, human, human society, or human thinking, it is not only an ecosystem in itself, but also a larger ecosystem. Yin and Yang are mutually born, Yin and Yang interact, Yin and Yang complement each other... etc. to keep the system running in a stable ecological way.

In Chinese philosophy, the essence of Three Talents Theory about “Heaven, Earth and Man” is the relationship between man and nature. In this unified ecosystem of man and nature, on the one hand, it affirms the organic composition of heaven, earth and man, establishes man’s position in nature, and on the other hand, it also affirms man’s creativity. In fact, Heaven performs its duties as time, this refers to the laws of nature, while the earth performs its duties as space. In fact, this means that the earth is the great mother who nurtures us, and the duty of human beings is to make use of the things provided by heaven and earth to create.

If we want to give full play to human creativity, we need to pursue the realm of “harmony between man and nature”, which is not only the Taoist idea, but also followed by Buddhism and Confucianism. Confucianism is the philosophy of China’s rulers, regulating human behavior and demonstrating the social relationship between monarch and minister by “heaven, earth and man”. Buddhism emphasizes the “nothingness” of nature by ignoring the objective material world, that is, the so-called “nothing in sight, where to cause dust”. Therefore, Buddhism emphasizes the self-cultivation of the subject person, not only the cultivation of thinking (practice of mind), but also the cultivation of the body (practice of body).

The theory of the Four Images is the basis of the theory of the Five Elements and the bridge between the theory of Yin and Yang and the theory of the Five Elements. The “Four Images Model” reflects the geographical and climatic characteristics of China and the natural law of ecological changes in the four seasons, and is a scientific model with ecological significance. Four Images, space involving four directions, time involving four seasons. The Chinese mainland has four distinct seasons, which provides a natural basis for the “Four Images Model” of space-time integration. In addition, according to the Chinese astronomical phenomena, according to the relative position of the Big Dipper: “bucket handle points to the east, and all the world is spring; bucket handle points to the south, the world is summer; bucket handle points to the west, the world is autumn; bucket handle points to the north, the world is winter”. This closely combines the “Four Directions” with the “four seasons”. The “Four Images Theory” reveals the ecological principles of ancient Chinese culture.

Chinese philosophy uses the theory of Five Elements to describe laws of all things and life in the universe. The Five Elements, namely “gold, wood, water, fire and earth”, are five symbols used to represent different “material - energy - information” as a whole. The theory of Five Elements is a theory with Chinese characteristics and has very different connotations compared with the ancient Greek theory of “water, wood, earth and air”.

The Eight Diagrams Theory is intrinsically linked to Yin and Yang. Eight Diagrams are the product of the combination of Yin and Yang Theory and Three Talents Theory. The “divination image” of the Eight Diagrams directly uses the eight elements in the nature ecosystem, they are “sky, earth, mountain, swamp, thunder, wind, water and fire”, they are of metaphor and symbolism, and they are used to illustrate the specific nature and mutual relationship. The Eight Diagrams also represent different things in the universe, different animals, different people and different things. It is Chinese philosophy that regards nature as a whole system, and studies various attributes in the whole with Yin and Yang, Five Elements and Eight Diagrams.
Confucianism and Democracy: on Roger Ames’s understanding of Democracy

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This paper clarifies Roger Ames’s idea of democracy, locates its position in current discussion on Confucianism and Democracy, and presents several challenges against Ames’s idea. By comparing John Dewey and Confucianism, Ames proposes a different idea of democracy from the liberalism understanding of democracy. First of all, Ames argues that Dewey’s view is different from liberalism in the following five aspects: (1) whether democracy depends on an abstract concept of individual; (2) whether democracy assumes the idea of natural rights; (3) whether democracy is built upon free market capitalism; (4) whether democracy should promote certain moral or religious doctrines; (5) whether democracy should solely depend on law rather than morality to maintain its stability. The second step of Ames’s argument is to draw similarities between Dewey and Confucianism with regard to the idea of democracy: against essentialism of human nature; affirming the social nature of human beings; moral cultivation of political leaders; the duty of remonstrance; and the importance of tradition; and community as the basis of democracy. At the end, Roger Ames argue that we should endorse a view of Democracy that is a combination of Dewey’s view and Confucianism.

In the second section of this paper I locate Roger Ames’s view in current discussion on Confucianism and Democracy. According to Stephen Angle’s category, Ames belongs to the group of Synthetic Confucians, who introduce non-Confucian philosophical traditions to generate a synthetic form of Confucianism that is compatible with democracy. According to Nicholas Spina, Ames would belong to the group that promote the convergence interpretation and hold that Confucianism and democracy can be reformulated into a hybrid system. In the last section I present the following challenges to Ames’s view: first, his idea of democracy is incompatible with a modern idea of political equality; second, his idea of democracy cannot host basic human rights; third, his idea of democracy treats democracy more as a kind of culture, ideals or aesthetic attitudes, rather than a political institute; fourth, his idea of democracy is a kind of perfectionism.
Did the Buddha have a metaphysics?
On the Buddha’s attitude toward philosophy in the early sūtras

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For a long time, scholars have been arguing over whether there is a systematic philosophy or metaphysics that underlies the teachings in early Buddhist sūtras. Recent studies by Sue Hamilton, Noa Ronkin, and Eviatar Shulman propose that although early Buddhism as represented in the major Nikāyas displays a strong inclination toward practice and experience, it still holds a deep commitment to notions such as impermanence, rebirth, and dependent origination, which are generally accepted as “metaphysical” in Western philosophy. The present study will draw on evidence from early sūtras in the Pāli Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas to demonstrate that there are two foundational principles that have not been fully recognized in modern scholarship: (1) In early sūtras, “all” (sabba) means the twelve bases (āyatana), which consist of the six sense faculties and their corresponding objects, and one cannot postulate anything beyond this domain (visaya) of experience. (2) The use of a word is only justified when it refers to a phenomenon falling within the domain of experience. If a word is used to refer to something beyond, then it is only an empty utterance (vācāvatthu). I would like to argue that these principles match closely with Rudolf Carnap’s analysis of linguistic frameworks and his notion of metaphysics as concerning questions “external” to a linguistic framework. With Carnap’s tools of analysis, I will examine the “unanswered” questions regarding the world (loka), soul (jīva), self (attā), and an enlightened being (tathāgata) in early sūtras, and demonstrate how these questions are metaphysical questions because they involve words referring to things beyond the domain of experience. The Buddha’s answer to these questions is practical instead of theoretical just as Carnap has proposed: metaphysical questions are meaningless and can only be answered practically. The last part of my paper will analyze doctrines such as impermanence, rebirth, and dependent origination, which are considered “metaphysical” by modern scholars, and suggest that in early texts they are actually the contents of direct experiences instead of speculative theories, or in Carnap’s terminology, are “internal,” which means they are not metaphysical but experiential.
“Emptiness” (xu 虛) and “Wandering” (you遊):
Inquiring into the Aesthetics of Zhuangzi

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“Wandering” (xu 虛) is the concept representing the spirit of Zhuangzi’s aesthetics, and “emptiness” (you遊) is the concept that plays a crucial role in the discussion on the aspect of aesthetics, or contextually speaking, the aspect of the art of practice in Zhuangzi philosophy. “Being empty and awaiting things” (xu er dai wu虚而待物) is the major statement of the theory of practice (gong fu lun工夫論), which refers to a particular state called “the fasting of the mind” (xin zhai心齋) and relates the “sitting-forgetting” (zuo wang坐忘), another key concept to be described as the state of the True Man. Additionally, the topic of “practice” does not focus on the aspect of “subject” independently rather highlight the inherent connection between subject and object, which explains the reason that practice is supposed to be seen as an essential thread for clarifying the structure of “the theory of things” (wu lun物論) and as the central part of Zhuangzi’s aesthetics. Perhaps this non-duality is not noteworthy enough if the focus is on the realm of the eastern philosophy in a broad sense, which means the non-duality in Zhuangzi is just an example of non-duality in the eastern context. In this paper, I attempt to concentrate on the nuance of “emptiness” in order to reveal the uniqueness of the spirit of “wandering”, which spirit represents an eastern type of non-duality and also implies a possible approach for the furtherance of the structure of non-duality.
Zhuangzi, in an attempt to change our perspectives on death, sometimes talks as if we can survive death in an interesting naturalistic manner. For instance, speaking to one on their deathbed, Master arrive says “Wonderful, the process which fashions and transforms us! What is it going to turn you into…? Will it make you into a rat’s liver? Or a fly’s leg?” (Graham 2001, 88) In this paper, my aim is not textual interpretation, but rather to explore how well the literature on the metaphysics of material objects can lend support to the sort of intrigue towards death Zhuangzi appeals to. I begin by criticizing Alexis Elder’s (2014) interpretation of the passage—though it might be faithful to the view Zhuangzi has in mind, I argue that it is metaphysically unmotivated.

Instead I argue that popular arguments for unrestricted diachronic composition—that, for any temporal parts of objects, the ‹xs, there is an object composed of those ‹xs—can provide an alternative foundation. For this view implies that, for any person S, there are numerous objects, the Os, that coincide with S; and many of the Os coincide with other objects at times beyond S’s death (i.e., they survive S’s death). And, for those Os that survive S’s death, some coincide with rat livers or bug arms (and yet others coincide with human beings). I argue that, since the objects that coincide a person have the same mental life of the person they coincide, S has good reason to think that S could be one of the Os that survives S’s death. If so, then it’s possible to survive death in a way similar to what Zhuangzi envisions.
The Art of Self-Understanding through Dreams in Islamic Mysticism

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Experiencing true dreams is an inspirational part of Muslims’ daily life. It is believed that night dream is a way through metaphysical and divinatory world. True dreams can provide the dreamer with moral guidance, good or bad news in the future, and even commanding the dreamer to follow a rule or correct a misconduct. These functions of dream can be achieved through either literal or symbolic dreams.

In this article, an attempt has been made to survey the anecdotes narrated in Muslim mystical works showing the relation of dreams to self-understanding and how they uncover the mental and spiritual dimensions of the dreamer. I will argue that dream is a pivotal element in Islamic mysticism and is considered as a minor death that leads to freedom of the dreamer’s soul and consequently presents the spiritual virtues or shortcomings of the dreamer. In the final chapter of this article, I will show how such spiritual dreams enable the spiritual mentors to give advice and help their pupil along the mystical journey.

Keywords: Self-understanding, Dreams, Islam, Mysticism.
From a philosophy of culture to religious philosophy and back?  
Ernst Cassirer and Nishida Kitarō concepts of philosophy in comparison

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In this paper, I argue that Cassirer and Nishida – despite having seemingly opposing views on philosophy – share a common philosophical aim: to strike a balance between academic theory and the imminence of life.

I elucidate their respective projects regarding contributions to the discourse on what philosophy actually is. This is an important discourse at that time not only in Germany represented by such iconic encounters as in Davos between Heidegger und Cassirer but also in Japan not only present in ongoing discussions but also in publications such as the Tetsugaku Kōza of Iwanami (published in the early 1930ies) which collects the entire scope philosophical positions available at that time by the most prominent thinkers of Japan.

The paper begins with a historical account of Cassirer’s and Nishida’s (non-)meeting and the influence of German philosophy in Japan. The main task is to delineate their respective concepts of philosophy based on their critiques of the philosophy of life on the one hand, and of academic mainstream, i.e. neokantian philosophy on the other hand. It will become visible from an account and comparison of their late 1920ies and early 1930ies writings that the concept of culture becomes an important point of their intellectual orientation both in Germany and Japan.

I will conclude with a brief summary of the shared aspects of their views based on similarities between their concepts such as form, which open a horizon for further investigation into the identity and difference between these two philosophers from Germany and Japan.
Arts of Understanding in Daoism

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In this paper, I discuss understanding as a specific attitude to reality that can be realised in two main ways: as a differentiation based on a cognitive process with clearly distinguished components or as a unity based on a process of mutual experience and intuitive insight. In my paper, I argue that the Daoist kind of understanding belongs to the second type. I use two approaches in order to consider the art of understanding in Daoism. One can be described as an inner comparison and the other as an outer comparison.

Within the inner comparison, I consider the famous parable of Zhuangzi about joy of fishes, from one side, and the description of the characteristic and behaviour of the skilful master of dao as presented in the 15 chapter of Daodejing, from the other. I show that both texts reveal two different, equally important and complementing each other, aspects of the understanding in terms of unity. Their combination presents the understanding as an act of creative and complete experience of being and becoming of/in the world that suppose a full presence in the moment of here-and-now. Therefore, this mode of understanding could be perceived as a special art of leaving as well.

Within the outer comparison, I relate the understanding in terms of unity and understanding in terms of differentiation. In this case, I compare Daoist view with the mode of logical understanding presented both in Chinese (the logician Huizi, opponent of Zhuangzi in the parable) and Western thought (the considerations of Aristotle in Metaphysics). Using this comparison, I try to realise whether and how the Daoist mode of understanding can be used in terms of the contemporary European situation. This study is conducted within the frame of my current Maria Sklodowska-Curie project about the perception of Eastern teachings in Europe.
The Practice of Yoga and the Extended Mind Hypothesis

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In their paper, “The Extended Mind,” Clark and Chalmers first proposed the idea of an extended mind in the form of extended cognition. In his book, Out of Our Heads (2010), Noë goes beyond the idea of extended cognition found in Clark and Chalmers to argue that we should view consciousness itself as being fundamentally extended in nature. Specifically, Noë demonstrates the ways in which habitual actions allow us to use and change our environment as a way of structuring our consciousness and shaping our mental lives. The extended mind hypothesis has created a paradigm shift in the philosophy of mind and has supported a growing interest in the notion of embodied cognition. In a recent keynote address to the Mind Life Institute, Thompson argued against an increasingly narcissistic and consumerist environment surrounding mindfulness practices and attributed this in part to a neuro-centric approach to mindfulness, in which mindfulness becomes a way of ‘sculpting’ one’s brain. Instead, he argued for an understanding of mindfulness as an embodied cognitive skill and a social practice, not a private mental state or special brain state. Much of his critique of the contemporary mindfulness tradition is relevant to other contemplative practices, such as the practice of yoga. In my paper, I bring a sensibility similar to that of Thompson towards mindfulness, to show that the paradigm of embodied cognition is a fruitful lens through which to view the concentric practices outlined by Patañjali in the Yoga Sūtras. Drawing on the work of philosophers such as Clark and Noë, I will argue that the habitual practices outlined by Patañjali embody an extended mind approach. This is seen in the ways in which he harnesses the environments of both body and the broader social and natural worlds in the project of cognitive transformation through the practice of yoga.

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Cosmopolitan Harmony with Eco-Family: The Art of Eco-Caring and Understanding

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“家和万事成 (jiāhé wànshì xīng) If the family lives in harmony, all affairs will prosper.”

Understanding the importance of family ethics in East Asian Confucian culture is a best way of learning about East Asian Confucian society. In East Asian Confucian societies there is a legacy of traditionally patrilineal family order, by which titles and rituals are inherited by male family lineage. The central Confucian virtues of family are filial piety (xiao 孝) and family harmony (jiahe家和), but these have been historically misogynistically practiced. The concepts of household and family have been employed by patriarchal systems of oppression in Eastern as well as Western cultures to subordinate women. The patriarchal dimensions of household management serve to promote male members of families as the heads of the household and maintain primary power and predominance in roles of political leadership, moral authority, social privilege and control and distribution of family property. There are some patriarchal dangers of using such household metaphor in feminist studies due to the Western myth of universal patriarchy and the hegemony of a transcendent male monotheistic God that have justified males as heads of household. Despite destructive effects of household and family metaphors, some ecofeminist scholars such as Sallie McFague reconstruct the term oikos as “the whole earth” the sacred household in which we are all called to live. Salim is a Korean term, literally meaning “enlivening.” However, both salim and women have been inferiortized as women’s household tasks by housewives although they both are most fundamental entities for living. This paper suggests a planetary expansion of family toward an interconnected ecosystem for making a cosmopolitan harmony with “eco-family” via salim, “eco-caring” activities. The expansive meaning of salim should be practiced out as all diverse activities for enlivening a sustainable symbiosis with the cosmopolitan extension of eco-family.
In the perspective of bringing into resonance the two philosophies of Zhu Xi and Gilles Deleuze I shall describe Zhu Xi’s theory of feelings (qing 情), nature (xing 性), and heart/mind (xin 心) in terms of Deleuze’s three syntheses of time in his „Difference and Repetition“: the „living present“ of larval subjects, the virtual pure memory, and the pure form of time. Deleuze distinguishes, in case of the first two syntheses, between a more fundamental „passive synthesis“ and a derived „active“ one; for Zhu Xi the main distinction is, in case of the feelings, between a clear and a muddy qi 氣 involved in them; and in case of nature, between a narrow or obstructed and broad or unimpeded expression of it. The third synthesis of time, for Deleuze, involves the fractured „I“ (Je) or the dissolved „self“ (moi), so that through a transformation, finally „what the self has become equal is the unequal in itself“ (Deleuze 1993: 90). Using very different metaphors, Zhu Xi refers to different self-cultivation methods, that „enlarge the heart/mind“ (daxin 大心). The apotheosis of this is the figure of the sage who is the most capable of transformation and to whom Deleuze’s citation of being equal to the unequal applies well.

This endeavour has also a methodological value. A distinction could be made between comparison that takes place between two items that are already given, and between bringing into resonance, where we find a more fluid reality, that takes shape in this very resonating and through the very incongruences between the elements of the system, so that it may tell us something that we would not have expected without this resonance.
Acts of Redeployment: Is Indra’s Net Ecological?

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Abstract: Joanna Macy once wrote ‘the heart that breaks open can contain the whole universe’, but how is this possible? How can I contain everything within me? A trend often seen today inside and outside of academia is the utilisation of the Huayan understanding of Indra’s Net to explain this mode of interdependence. Within this paper I will explore a brief history of Indra’s Net before examining how the analogy is being used today for ecological purposes. Through this exploration I will demonstrate that our understanding of Indra’s Net has as much of its roots in Western transcendental and romantic thought as it does with the ancient traditions of India and China where the analogy first emerged and then developed. I will then explore the question as to what extent is it acceptable for Indra’s Net to become redeployed for ecological purposes and whether the authors utilising the analogy are doing so through an orientalist lens.

I will conclude by arguing that in order to utilise Indra’s Net today we must make a distinction between drawing on the analogy as a conceptual resource or, using Indra’s Net as evidence for arguments. Ecology is a field the analogy was previously never meant to exemplify. By understanding that there is a middle way between complete use and no use of the analogy within the orientalist debate surrounding its modern interpretations, we will see that in framing Indra’s Net as a conceptual resource to help understand modernity’s problems, rather than projecting these problems back on the analogy itself, we may sidestep the shadow of orientalism looming over many contemporary accounts of the analogy and move towards observing the positive qualities this analogy contains for helping us understand our modern world.
Qi in the Mengzi

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The unmoved mind 不動心 is the most controversial concept in the Mengzi. According to Mengzi, to achieve the unmoved mind, one needs to cultivate his or her qi 氣. Therefore, in order to fully understand the unmoved mind 不動心, we must understand the qi 氣 in the Mengzi. During the pre-Qin period, ‘qi 氣’ usually meant vitality, which can be renewed through intake of food and is necessary for the normal operation of the body organs. The ‘qi 氣’ in the Mengzi also connotes it. However, Mengzi, in addition to this, uses ‘qi 氣’ to refer to a mood and temperament as well. These are formed by the external environment or the experiences which someone encounters, but, in reverse, influence the way someone reacts to the external environment and help or impede someone’s action. These things, namely vitality, mood and temperament, in itself, do not contain any intention 志. However, they still can make a difference in what desire someone would have and how actively someone try to fulfill that desire. Therefore, the qi 氣 in the Mengzi, can be summed up as an atmosphere of mind that influences the expression of desire and the action for fulfilling the desire but does not have a desire in itself. People can pursue unmoral values with powerful qi 氣, so, in Mengzi’s understanding, qi 氣 itself cannot guarantee someone’s morality. However, even though someone has a morally good intention, she still needs to have enough qi 氣 to put her intention into practice. Also, in order to have a morally good intention, it is necessary to maintain a certain gentle state of qi 氣. Therefore, for Mengzi, it is an important factor in the moral cultivation of the individual.
Derrida, Buddhism, and the Art of Misunderstanding

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Communication is based on the assumption that the involved parties share the ground for understanding. What if such an assumption is betrayed, even unbeknownst to the involved dialoguers?

Buddhism and Derrida’s deconstruction reveal the domains in which the distortion of understanding happens. Approaching self-knowledge and the self’s understanding of the external world from within, Buddhism identifies the source of the misunderstanding in the mind of the speaker and offers a way to restore an encounter with the external world as it is. Derrida’s trajectory focuses on the external world. He claims that our interpretations of the world are already constrained by the rules of power that have been consolidated through our use of language and logic. From Derrida’s perspective, an institution, be it a language, the law, or social organizations, is always already a locus that is based on a misleading understanding of the self and others.

This paper examines the interpretation of Zen and Yogācāra Buddhism of the mind and consciousness as sources of misunderstanding of the self and others. In comparison, the paper also explores Derrida’s deconstruction of the institution as the embedded structure of our misunderstanding of the self and others. Putting together internal and external approaches to misunderstanding in Buddhism and Derrida’s deconstruction, the paper aims to reveal the synergy of the relationship between power and misunderstanding in our engagement with ourselves and the world.
Teaching Introduction to Philosophy with van Norden's "Taking Back Philosophy"

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I will share insights I gained by teaching Bryan van Norden's book Taking Back Philosophy to two undergraduate classes in Introductory philosophy. I will explain how I changed the order in which I covered the material (from the order of chapters in the book), beginning with What is Philosophy? and Why Study Philosophy? I hoped to engage students in thinking about why they might want to study philosophy right from the start of the semester, in order to motivate them to do well in what was a required course for them. I will discuss how van Norden's presentation of issues in Chinese philosophy worked well with students. I will also explain how some students were sensitive to his political messages and critiques, and how I handled that in the classroom. I'll also explain what additional materials I used for the course in order to ensure a well-rounded exposure to philosophy from various parts of the world including ancient Egypt and ancient India, other parts of Africa and Latin America.
The paper aims at reconstructing the philosophy of history of Zhang Xuecheng (1738-1801), and particularly – his theory of historical understanding. In order to analyse it accurately, I shall place it within the broader context of his metaphysics of history that describes the transformations of the Dao within human history. As I shall show, not only his typology of intellectual fashions, which results in the idea of the historical cycles of the degenerated understanding of Dao, but also the paradoxical historicism of Zhang (namely the belief that the Classics are not different than histories) is deeply rooted in his metaphysical assumptions. By complementing the conditions for being a good historian with the notion of the “virtue of a historian,” Zhang shows the direct impact of human feelings and dispositions on the shape of historical narrative, which leads to his distinctive hermeneutics. Zhang believes that based on the understanding of common emotions, on the grounds of the existing sources-traces, the historian makes inferences that relate to the ultimately incommunicable and ineffable historical experience of participating in events. To this end, a historian needs to be equipped with respect and empathy, which is understood as the ability to put oneself in place of the people from the past. In the conclusion, the view of Zhang Xuecheng is compared with its counterparts in the modern Western theory of history.
How not to argue – Dharmakīrti and Nyāya on the defeats in a debate

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The philosophers from the Nyāya tradition devote much attention to the topic of debate or discussion (kathā). Already in the first sūtra of Gautama (NS 1.1.1) the three types of debates appear among the main topics to be examined: 1) the debate for truth (vāda), 2) disputation (jalpa) and 3) destructive debate (vitāṇda). The rules of debates and techniques of argumentation are scrupulously analysed as the follow-on subjects, namely: fallacies, equivocation, misleading objections, and points of defeat (nigrahasthāna).

The concept of ‘points of defeat’ (nigrahasthāna), also translated as ‘ways of losing an argument’, ‘clinchers’ or ‘distorted understanding’, was the initial point of critique for Dharmakīrti (7th cent CE), the key Buddhist opponent of the Nyāya tradition, in his concise text “The Logic of Argumentation” (Vādanyāya). He appeals to the Nyāya concept of debate (vāda) by using their philosophical terms, however he provides his own interpretations and categorisations. Additionally, he points out distinct roles played by the disputant and the opponent and, subsequently, different clinchers or distorted understanding applicable to one and not the other (i.e. epistemic flaws, violations of pragmatic principles and procedural flaws) which are the causes of one’s victory and other’s defeat.

In my paper, I scrupulously investigate Dharmakīrti’s concept of rules of debates introduced in polemics with the Nyāya epistemologists with a particular focus on clinchers, and I compare them with their original formulations, as found in Nyāyasūtra and its commentaries of Vātsyāyana (5th cent CE) and Uddyotakara (6th cent CE). These epistemological issues of the rules for debates for the theory of argumentation and justification were so far not thoroughly studied – despite of the availability of the Sanskrit editions of Dharmakīrti’s work Vādanyāya and its English translation by P. Gokhale. The topic of proper argumentation is of importance to more recent argumentation theory, interpersonal communication and expertise, as such being of relevance to cross-cultural and comparative philosophy.

Bibliography:
From Shunya to Spanda: Expression and Understanding in *Vijnanabhairava Tantra*

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From a vast emptiness arises the primordial sound and expresses itself in various forms. Indic texts from Upanisads to Tantras unequivocally say that one’s true being is the same as that reality. In Rigveda 10:129, we hear the elemental vibration or spanda that arises from beyond all polarities. From the windless breath of Tadekam, That One, all reality unfolds. It is the bursting forth from beyond both existence and non-existence, a primal creative ideation which expresses itself as a triune sound. From Mandukya Upanisad that expounds the mystery of AUM to various Shakta/Shaiva texts, the seed sound expands the meaning of our existence in unity with that totality. In *Vijnanabhairava Tantra*, the Goddess Bhairavi asks the God, Bhairava, who is her very self, to expound that truth and provide the methodology. He provides 112 ways to actualize the truth of one’s unity with that suchness, Tat/Bhairava. But how does one understand this cryptic text?

Pranava is the elemental bija from where the art of understanding evolves. It is paradoxically realized when a yogi meditates on his heart about the void-ness of all objects. One must enter the mandala metaphorized in a colorful peacock feather and dissolve all perception to get a glimpse of that boundless freedom (svatantrya) which is our birthright. From the earliest times, commentaries have been written by yogis to explain its meaning for those eager to actualize that truth in their lives. One must be in a state of Shakti, according to verse 20, or be in a profound state of receptivity to comprehend this language. This paper will look closely at this Tantra and making use of language theories of Bhartrihari, attempt to make sense of how the language of scripture come alive in practice in the very act of dissolving its own structure into void-ness.
Despite a growing literature on the engagement with Nietzsche from an Asian perspective, the prominent Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō remains amiss from this discussion. The aim of this presentation is to rectify this omission by explicating Watsuji’s interpretation of Nietzsche, which will be done in relation to the existentialist and poststructuralist approaches. Here it will be demonstrated that Watsuji’s understanding of will to power, as ceaseless conquest and creation, combines the seemingly contradictory approaches of the existentialists, who attempt to achieve unity, and the poststructuralists, who maintain difference. By presenting an account which transcends the existentialist and poststructuralist, the originality of Watsuji’s interpretation will be illustrated. However, the purpose of this paper is not simply to explicate a text which has not been published in English, but also to offer some considerations on how the relation established here will effect contemporary scholarship on both Nietzsche and Watsuji.
What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self?

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To extinguish dukkha requires that we be able to extinguish the illusion of self. For that reason both early and later forms of Buddhism developed a set of arguments to demonstrate that the idea of the self is an illusion. I will begin this talk with a brief review of some of the arguments, but I will then proceed to show that these arguments are not themselves sufficient to dispel the illusion. Even if we find the arguments convincing, the illusion of self does not disappear, because it does not exist only or even primarily on the cognitive level; at its core, it is more like an optical illusion or a mirage than a belief.

An illusion is not something which does not exist but is something which is not what it appears to be. As recent developments in cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology demonstrate, what exists is not a self but what Thomas Metzinger has called the “phenomenal self model,” a model that is the result of unconscious and multiple brain processes (there is no center of the brain which produces them), a model which creates a feeling of “mineness” and a sense of being a unified and coherent agent. These brain processes have evolved, because they serve a useful and necessary purpose – to make it possible for the human organism to navigate physical and social reality. The first implication of this is that extinguishing the illusion of self requires a special kind of meditative practice – e.g., vipassana. The second is that while it is possible to dispel the illusion through careful attention, the illusion reappears as soon as the meditative attention is no longer operative. As a corollary of the second implication, I want to argue that even enlightened individuals, insofar as they must continue to interact with others and take account of physical reality, must oscillate between a no-self perspective and a phenomenal self perspective.
Chiang Kai-shek’s Military Thought: A Comparative Ethical Perspective

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This paper attempts to (re)construct a reasonably coherent account of Chiang Kai-shek’s military ethics from his writings and addresses during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945. As Chiang is somewhat of an eclectic thinker or bricoleur (as some might put it now)—combining direct and implicit references to classical Confucian texts and figures, Neo-Confucian scholar-generals (e.g., Wang Yang-ming and Zeng Guofan), Sun Yat-sen’s political thought, Sun Tzu’s Art of War, Christianity (especially biblical texts and figures), and even the Japanese Bushido code--the paper initially uses as a heuristic device the just-war typology of ius ad bellum, ius in bello, and ius post bellum, but not in a heavy-handed way. Much of Chiang’s thinking about military matters regarding just or righteous war deploys the language of virtue and character development as well as invoking moral and military exemplars (including both historical figures and episodes). What is striking about his military thought is the ease by which he can move, for example, from Sun Tzu’s strategy to Jesus as a revolutionary figure, or, for another example, deepen the just cause of self-defense by implicitly invoking Zeng’s just cause of preserving an entire civilization and its values from annihilation (here think. e.g., of Walzer’s idea of supreme emergency). This paper brings the tools of comparative ethics and philosophy to clarify and assess Chiang’s own internal comparative moral thought.
Which illusion, if any, should we accept? Self, Consciousness, Both, or Neither

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In this talk I will create a conversation across the traditions of analytical philosophy of mind and classical Indian philosophy concerning the nature of the self and consciousness. I will explore the thesis of asymmetric illusionism --that only either the self or consciousness is an illusion, but not both, and dual illusionism --the view that the self and consciousness are an illusion. I will ultimately argue on the basis of the concepts of metaphysical asymmetric dependence and epistemic friction that minimal realism about the self and consciousness are true, and that this thesis cannot be understood with the framework of two-truths.
In Favor of Projecting a Meaning onto the Text

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It is common to hear the objection that an interpretation “is projecting a meaning onto the text.” In reality, it is a fundamental principle of hermeneutics that it is impossible to interpret without bringing to the text a repertoire of concepts and assumptions. As Gadamer explains, “A person who is trying to understand a text is always performing an act of projecting. He projects before himself a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text.” However, as Gadamer also recognizes, this does not entail that there are no constraints on interpretation.

In this presentation, I argue against both “Interpretive Empiricism” (the mistaken view that interpretation is a straightforward matter of applying the lexicon and grammar to mechanically produce a translation) and “Interpretive Idealism” (the mistaken view that interpretation is unconstrained by lexicon, grammar, intellectual context, or history). I illustrate my argument with specific passages and translations from the Mengzi and the Mean.
In the *Meno*, when he is asked about whether virtue is acquired by learning or by practice, Socrates responds that he does not know. This answer is hardly surprising, as Socrates is famous for claiming that the only thing he knows is that he knows nothing. Compared to a torpedo that creates doubt, Socrates acknowledges that he is himself full of perplexities. Socrates then argues, that in order to find out how virtue may be acquired, it is first necessary to define what virtue is. In the process of inquiring into the nature of virtue, Socrates further describes perplexity as providing an opportunity to mark off the unknown, i.e., that which needs investigation. Far from being an obstacle, doubt and perplexity are a step in the process towards understanding virtue.

Perplexity (惑) is also a topic in the *Analects* where Confucius connects it with wisdom and virtue, but apparently in an opposite way to Socrates: “The wise person is free from perplexities” (“知者不惑”). Like Socrates, Confucius never identifies himself with being a wise man and he lets us know that “At forty, I had no doubts,” which suggests that he too had earlier experiences of perplexity. Moreover, resolving the moral doubts of his disciples is one of his tasks. For example, to discern real virtue and to avoid delusion (辨惑) are parts of the understanding of virtue taught by Confucius. According to him, the ability to weight the different behavioral responses in a situation, and to choose the appropriate one, is not only a practical way to resolve moral perplexity; it is an expression of virtue.

Reading Plato’s *Meno* and Confucius’ *Analects*, we observe that in both texts, doubt and perplexity are described as steps in the process of understanding “virtue”, as a practical ability.

**Keywords:** Doubt, practical virtue, comparative philosophy.
“Hum Hai Ke Hum Nahin”  
Vishal Bhardwaj’s *Haider* as Transcreation  

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Bhardwaj’s *Haider* is a translation of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* onto the political turmoil of Kashmir in the mid 1990s. This presentation will focus on the recurring reference to the famous lines, “To Be or Not to Be” – in Hindi, *Hum Hai Ke Hum Nahin*, more accurately translated, “Am I, or am I not?” – which emphasizes the present tense, the urgency of the current moment. Bhardwaj draws on Bollywood conventions and on Indian philosophical terms and cultural practices to create a new reading of the text. As such, *Haider* can be seen as a transcreation, or a creative translation, in which, as Mukund Lath suggests, “the new is born through imaginatively restructuring the old.” Walter Benjamin’s thoughts on the “afterlife” of a text will be addressed in this context (“The Task of the Translator”), as well as Daya Krishna’s notion of creativity, as presented in “Thinking Creatively About the Creative Act” (1999).

The recurring references to the phrase show Bhardwaj to be exploring the existential question in a number of ways: he addresses the ethical and political identity of Kashmir, as well as the larger political impasse: does Kashmir ‘exist’ – or is it merely seen in terms of India and Pakistan? My analysis will be informed by Daya Krishna’s essay “Freedom, Reason, Ethics and Aesthetics” (2007).

Bhardwaj additionally takes Haider’s questioning to a metaphysical level, as he is awakened to a deeper consciousness. Alongside the political, he also contemplates the very point and purpose of being, articulating an inherent incongruity between present and absent, which is one of the corner stones of Kashmir Shaivism. Using insights from Arindam Chakrabarti’s essay, “The Heart of Repose, the Repose of the Heart” (2005), I will consider the ways Kashmir Shaivism permeates questions of identity throughout the film.

Finally, in an attempt to find the truth behind the questioning, Bhardwaj introduces a song-and-dance number, which both utilizes and subverts Bollywood convention (itself influenced by the Great Indian Epics), while simultaneously drawing on the convention of a play-within-a-play of *Hamlet*. The dramatic twist in the final scene of the film offers an alternative to the revenge narrative, offering new directions and possibilities. Bhardwaj’s adaptation becomes a new and original work of art insofar as it goes beyond passing on mere information, beyond replicating the plot, and engages in what Benjamin calls “the unfathomable, the mysterious, the ‘poetic’.”
On Guabian (Interchanging Hexagrams) as the Foundation of Interpreting the Classics of Hexagrams

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There are many famous Neo-Confucian philosophers such as Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi who showed great interest in the phenomena of interchanging hexagrams (guabian 卦变). Traditionally, there are many different opinions towards guabian (interchanging hexagrams) because some experts throughout the history of the Book of Changes admit that phenomena is reasonable, but others tend to deny it. I argue that whether guabian is reasonable depends on the understanding of the Tuan Commentary (tuanci 象辞), i.e. whether the Tuan Commentary has authority in interpreting the classics of hexagrams. As long as we consider that it is impossible to understand the words regarding hexagrams and lines without the Tuan Commentary, then it is unreasonable to deny the explanatory power of interchanging hexagrams (guabian). Without understanding the guabian, then it is extremely difficult to understand certain words related to interchanging hexagrams in the Tuan Commentary. These words in the Tuan Commentary are the most difficult, and those commentators who failed to understand the interchanging hexagrams (guabian) were normally unclear, and sometimes did not even know what was going on in their own commentaries. Also, it is not reasonable to understand the historical process how the wording regarding hexagrams and lines came into being, because it is through the interchanging of hexagrams (guabian) that ancient sages could read the changing images and wrote down the words of 64 hexagrams and 384 lines. Through my research on the background and theories of interchanging hexagrams of Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi and others, we come to realize that we should continue and promote the explanatory power of interchanging hexagrams in contemporary era.
The Self, The Two Truths, and The Narrative Account

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The narrative account of the self is characterized by the following commitment: the self is constituted by a narrative. In previous work, I articulate The Mental Stream View (MSV) a Yogacara Buddhist inspired version of the narrative account of the self. One of the major commitments of the Mental Stream View is that the self only exists within an organism generated representation. In this paper, I will look at how the two truths can help clarify this claim. This clarification is significant for two reasons. First, it shows how the MSV can overcome a major objection to the account. Second, it suggests a method for other narrativists, such as Daniel Dennett and Marya Schechtman, to respond to similar objections to their accounts. I conclude that making use of the two truths is a powerful strategy to avoid trivial misunderstandings within the narrative account of the self.
The Physics of Intentionality: 
A Buddhist Legal Theory of Culpability for Sexual Attraction

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Classic scholarship on Indian Buddhism views the introduction of intentionality as a standard for judging human behavior as a revolutionary moment for the Indian philosophical tradition. As the classic trope would have it, before the rise of Buddhism in India, an individual’s behavior was judged only according to the formal accomplishment of ritual tasks that were ethically content-less. A Buddhist monk was to be judged based on his intentions; the physicality of ritual/bodily action was to be regarded as a mere epiphenomenon of intent. However, my recent investigations into Buddhist legal codes, or Vinaya, suggests a profound distrust of this cut-and-dried expectation for the relation between intention and sensual experience. While the compilers of sutra literature were content to promulgate simplistic conceptions of relation between bodily desire and intention based on the Buddha’s absolute control over his senses, the legal theorists of codes governing the daily life of monastics undertook the hard work of actually thinking through how effectively the average male monastic was capable of operation out of intention. What they discovered was that it made far less sense to presume intention would ever guide behavior and that a complex micro-physics of desire was always at work disturbing and, often, undoing the galvanizing and managerial functions of self-governance. This tension between intention and the mechanics of desire is exemplified in Vinaya discussions of meditation on female corpses. The goal of the practice is to achieve a level of selfcontrol that subjugates all sexual desire to (right) intention. In my paper, I will articulate the implicit theory of a micro-physics of desire that conditions intentionality in these legal narratives.
Consciousness is perhaps the hottest topic in contemporary philosophy of mind. At this stage, it is difficult to accurately define this concept. Some hold it to be a unique first-person perspective that cannot be substituted by third-person approaches. Some others take it to be the what-it-is-like experience that a subject undergoes. More philosophers believe it is an explanatory gap or hard problem that resists easy and quick reduction to physical factors. In recent decades, a great variety of theories of consciousness are developed to account for what a mental state’s being conscious consists in. Among these theories, the most important contributions to the study of consciousness are the research on higher-order mental states and the controversies between higher-order and first-order theories and between different versions of higher-order theories.

Interestingly enough, in the history of Buddhist philosophy, there were also a great variety of theories addressing the issue how mental states become conscious or aware of themselves. By relying heavily on the metaphor of lamp, the early Buddhist school of Mahāsāṃghika and later Yogācāra-Mādhya-mikas proposed a reflexive model of consciousness. For them, mental states are, just like a lamp, aware of themselves at the same time when they are aware of external objects. The reflexive nature of consciousness is constitutive of the mind itself and marks the difference between sentient and insentient beings. This reflexive first-order theory was fiercely criticized by the Sarvāstivādins, who hold that mental states cannot be aware of themselves while representing external objects. These mental states become conscious only when retrospection or reflection takes place in the second moment. This move toward a higher-order reflective model of consciousness makes memory or temporal consciousness a central theme in their discussions. By resorting to the very memory argument, Dignāga, a representative of the Yogācāra-Sautrāntikas, developed his concept of self-consciousness (svasamvedana) that synthesizes the reflexive and reflective models of consciousness. This argument was in turn criticized in various aspects by many Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools after him.

In the current paper, I will focus on the memory argument for consciousness as developed by the Buddhists. By critically examining this argument, my study will contribute to the current discussions and debates on the nature of consciousness.
Vivekananda’s Critique of the Will as Brahman in Schopenhauer

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Even though Schopenhauer only ever read an inadequate version of the Vedas, what Vivekananda describes as a “not very clear translation made from an old translation into Persian and thence by a young Frenchman into Latin” (Vivekananda, S., The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda: First Public Lecture in the East. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1973), he was able to extract a rudimentary understanding of the kernel of Vedanta thought. Although Schopenhauer concludes that the ultimate reality is the will, seemingly in direct confrontation with the Advaita tradition which subsumes the will as a manifestation of the Absolute Brahman, his thought has a burgeoning seed striving to be explicated, that there are two poles of the will, a view expounded by Vivekananda, yet absent from his interpretation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. In this paper I will thus discuss Vivekananda’s critique of Schopenhauer’s understanding of the Vedas, and the manner in which Vivekananda fundamentally misunderstood Schopenhauer.