Geoff Ashton, University of San Francisco

*Signs of Spiritual Life in Nature: A Biosemiotics Interpretation of Puruṣa-Artha in the Śāṅkhya Kārikā*

In keeping with the values of traditional Hinduism, the ultimate meaning or purpose (artha) of Śāṅkhya philosophy is puruṣa-artha: to realize that the true self or consciousness (puruṣa) is free from entanglement in the natural world (prakṛti). But given that the self is always already free, then why does the human being pursue that which is already true? Relatedly, since the puruṣa is a passive witness consciousness, and hence cannot pursue anything at all, then for whom does the goal (artha) of liberating self-knowledge have meaning (artha)? This presentation examines how scholars have struggled to respond to these questions due to their misunderstanding how Śāṅkhya envisions nature (prakṛti), consciousness (puruṣa), and the interrelation between the two. It then suggests an alternative frame for approaching these issues: biosemiotics. According to biosemiotics, natural life and sign-activity are co-extensive: where there is life (even in its most basic form), there is the production of signs and the interpretation of those signs. By reading the puzzle of puruṣa-artha through this lens, I argue that nature (prakṛti) in Śāṅkhya denotes the biosemiotic organism. That is to say, prakṛti is an intelligent, goal-oriented, self-referential process, and puruṣa-artha is its sign. The human being, meanwhile, is one variety of this process: the human quest for self-knowledge reveals nature’s bio-semiotic agency to manifest itself.

Je Seong Bae, Sungkyunkwan University

*Mechanism for Interpreting and Motivating Moral Knowledge in Zhu Xi’s Doctrine of Gewu* 格物 (Investigation of Things)

Zhu Xi, one of the most prominent scholars of Chinese Neo-Confucianism, argued that all human beings are born with morally good nature. On the other hand, he also underscores the importance of acquiring external and objective moral knowledge in order to properly actualize the goodness of their nature. The second part of his philosophy is the reason for his particular emphasis of the term gewu 格物 – investigation of things – in Great Learning. Some contemporary scholars point out the apparent disaccord between the above two branches of Zhu Xi’s argument – the emphasis on the need for external knowledge may weaken the significance of the doctrine that all humans the motivation and disposition to be morally good from the onset.

In this study, I argue that the tension may be resolved as the two doctrines are not incompatible by exposing a mechanism that naturally leads from moral knowledge to moral motivation and action. More specifically, the meaning derived by interpreting objective moral knowledge is transmitted to the intrinsic structure of moral motivation and action in this postulated mechanism. Therefore, moral knowledge, after it is sufficiently interpreted and understood, can be integrated into the structure of moral motivation and action inherent in the human agent. Zhu Xi’s ethics, understood in this way, is a balanced moral philosophy that not only fully utilizes the moral sources that humans instinctively have within themselves, but also thoughtfully integrates respect for others and the community. I will also include discussion on the implications of these ethical features from the perspective of today’s pluralistic world.
Susanta Bhattacharya, Pedagogical University of Krakow

Does Liberation Entail Disembodiment? Re-examining the Concept of pratiprasava in the Yogasūtra

One of the central concepts in understanding the spiritual goal of Pātañjala Yoga is pratiprasava which means a process of reversal. Yet disagreements persist over how pratiprasava and kaivalya are to be interpreted. Two main lines of interpretation may be identified as the 'ontological' and 'epistemological' approaches. According to the ontological interpretation, pratiprasava means the literal dissolution of the empirical world including one’s physical body and mind. According to the epistemological interpretation, pratiprasava means the dissolution of the misidentification of puruṣa with prakṛti. I will defend a novel interpretation of pratiprasava and kaivalya that combines aspects of both the ontological and epistemological approaches. I argue that both the ontological and epistemological interpretations are partly true and partly false. I suggest that pratiprasava has two sequential stages: the epistemological stage and the ontological stage. In the epistemological stage, pratiprasava is the first stage of freedom (kaivalya) from all sorts of physical and mental bondages. This type of freedom is attained when all negative and positive effects of prakṛtic manifestation no longer affect the yogi while living in this physical body. In the subsequent ontological stage, pratiprasava is final freedom from existence altogether, including the physical body and mind. Based on this understanding of the two stages of pratiprasava, I will contend that there are correspondingly two types of kaivalya: embodied kaivalya and disembodied kaivalya.

Emma Lavinia Bon, Università del Piemonte Orientale, Italy

Non-dual Cosmogenesis: Advaita and non-aliud, a comparison

This contribution focuses on the concept of non-duality from a theological and cosmological point of view. This concept will be clarified through a comparison between the concept of advaita, as employed in tantric Kashmir Shaivism by Utpaladeva (Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā), Abhinavagupta (Tantrāloka) and Kṣemārāja (Śivasūtravimarśinī), and that of non-aliud employed by Nicholas of Cusa (De non-aliud). The significance of the notion of non-duality that will emerge from this comparison is twofold: on the one hand, it makes it possible not to deny the reality and the ontological consistency of the world; on the other hand, it allows not to radically separate God and the cosmos. Non-duality is neither a flat monism (as in some currents of Vedānta) nor a dualism, but the constitutive oscillation between the principle and its infinite permutations. In order to develop this idea and to show how the notion of non-aliud and that of advaita can count as homeomorphic equivalents (Panikkar) in their respective contexts of application, it will be necessary to dwell on some crucial concepts: that of locus and that of coincidentia oppositorum proposed by Cusa; the notion of spanda (vibration), and the polarity between prakāśa (light) and vimarśa (reflex awareness) in Kashmir Sivaism. In conclusion, and on the basis of what emerged from the problem under discussion, the fruitfulness of a comparative approach to theology will be supported, as it is capable of enhancing the points of contact between different traditions, putting them into dialogue.
Chinese Religious Diversities and Philosophy of Religion

Over the last decade or so, significant numbers of philosophers have been calling for a more diversified and self-critical approach to philosophy of religion. There have been calls for rethinking the field by expanding the range of religions considered, the focus of investigation (text-based or also lived religion), and meta-level examination of the concepts of “religion” and “philosophy.” This paper is intended to contribute to these diversifying efforts by considering Chinese religious diversities, not just different religions but also different ways in which religiosities manifest in Chinese society, and their relevance to the range, focus, and meta-level understanding of critical terms.

This paper contributes to diversifying philosophy of religion through inquiry into ordinary religious engagement in China. Perhaps the Chinese context shows, above all, that forms religions may take are not what one might expect a priori. Investigating one’s social contexts reveals differences, and possibilities of meaningful living linked with traditions. Drawing inspiration from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy, this paper identifies five themes relevant to globally engaged philosophy of religion that appear when paying attention to Chinese religious diversities: the relevance of the reception and use of concepts of religion to globally engaged philosophy of religion; the plurality of ways that religiosities may be combined; the pragmatic ways that people may adopt religious practices, beliefs, values, and institutions; the plausible combination of atheism with non-theistic religious ideas and practices; and the forms of state power over social manifestations of religions as well as what even may be classified as a religion. Attention to these diversities will help globally engaged philosophers avoid confusion, contribute to opening scholars’ imaginations to the wide range of human possibilities when it comes to religiosities, and potentially generate new insights on similar phenomena.

The Kyoto School of Philosophy and Interpersonal Awakening as Seen in Collective Narrative Practice

Kyoto School philosophers like Nishitani Keiji, Tanabe Hajime, and Watsuji Tetsuro regularly draw on Dogen. In Religion and Nothingness, Nishitani articulates Dogen’s structure of "forgetting the self" and "awakening to the ten thousand things" via the transition from the standpoint of nihility to the standpoint of emptiness. What is less often discussed is the relational and interpersonal nature of this awakening. While suffering is often depicted as existential and solitary, samsara suggests collective suffering where attachments and limit situations are shared. Thus, awakening is not of a solitary sage, but an awakening to a circuminsessional relationship where self and other relate in a manner that is beyond “self.” We see a similar logic in Tanabe’s idea of shared metanoia and Watsuji’s ideas of ethics and group creativity. But how can this theory be practiced? And what might practice look like in the contemporary world of laypersons with its cultural difference and plurality of values? This presentation draws from David Denborough’s Collective Narrative Practice (2019) and the more overtly interpersonal practices of Michael White's narrative therapy, which are grounded in a social constructionist view of the self that is relational and anti-essentialist. Examining practices like the tree of life, it considers how closed identities are destabilized and individuals are progressively decentered through their realization
of their relational existence, and how this relational existence is further affirmed in collective practices like the forest of life.

Allen Chiu, University of Dundee

On Deleuze, Nāgārjuna, and Religion/Mythology: A Possible Path to a Buddhist Deleuze

Much has been made about the potential closeness between Deleuze and Buddhism, from Slavoj Žižek’s recent article mentioning Deleuze and Nāgārjuna to the “Deleuze and Buddhism” book edited by Tony See and Joff Bradley. In light of this established closeness, what this piece seeks to do is to examine one potential point of incompatibility between Deleuze and Nāgārjuna, that being their respective positions with regards to religion and mythology. The aim here is to show that the differences between Deleuze and Nāgārjuna’s positions on religion and mythology do not necessarily preclude the similarity and closeness that might be established between the two, but rather that said difference may simply serve as an additional lens or spotlight which might highlight the potential closeness between Deleuze and Nāgārjuna and Deleuze and Buddhism.

Furthermore, in order to set up a potential line of flight from Deleuze to Nāgārjuna, an examination of the impact that Deleuze’s atheism had on his metaphysics is required. This will be done by heavily drawing upon what Marie Chabbert translates as ‘Tranquil Atheism’ in her article “On Becoming Secular: Gilles Deleuze and the Death of God”. Said examination becomes the basis for a reading of Deleuze and Guttari’s notion of conceptual personae from What is Philosophy?, which serves to emphasize the underlying boundaries and direction of Deleuze’s metaphysical project. While an actual comparative analysis between Deleuze and Nāgārjuna is beyond the scope of this piece, given the lack of an incompatibility between Deleuze’s metaphysical project and Nāgārjuna’s relationship with religion and mythology it leaves open and invites the consideration of such an effort. For if Deleuze’s atheism unnecessarily closed him off from Buddhism, then in Nāgārjuna might not we find a Deleuze taken far enough?

Sung-Hwan Cho, Wonkwang University

Qi philosophy in the Anthropocene: Choi Han-Gi’s Understanding of Qi as Agency

Choi Han-gi, a Korean philosopher in the 19th century, established Kihak 氣學, a Neo-Confucian study of Qi that explained the movement of nature, human activity, and tool use as so many transformations of qi as a vital and vitalizing essence of material becomings. How to best understand what is uniqueness in Choi’s conception of Qi is a really interesting problem. To begin with we must recognize that he understood Qi as an agency in itself or as part of an actor-network theory. Given that the Anthropocene can be characterized as the totalizing intrusion of reality rendering all objects dependent of the human subject, we might think productively with Choi’s Kihak as a sense of material agencies exercising a metamorphosis of qi in the context of sympoietic entanglement of human-nature-technology. Although East Asian philosophies have explained all changes and transformation in terms of qi, it is perhaps Choi Han-Ki that best saw a novel possibility of assemblage in the network of material agencies. This paper
seeks for a reinterpretation of Choi’s Qi perspective in dialogue with energy philosophies more generally, reinterpretating East Asian understandings of qi in terms of actor-network perspectives. By problematizing the Anthropocene conception of an inescapable human trace over all nature, we might return to a reinvigorated qi-based vitalist ethics and politics that can assist us in getting past the dead-end stalemates of current Northeast Asian geopolitical configurations.

Maoyuan Ding, Hubei Institute of Fine Arts

Is Human Nature Changeable? A comparison of Buddhism and Christianity for understanding the relationship between life and form

In Fukuyama’s book Our Post-Human Future: The Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution, he maintains “the unity or the continuity of human nature”, which arouses heated debate: has human nature changed in the post-human era? The question of whether human nature is changeable not only involves the historical evolution and definition of the concept of human nature, but also needs to be reflected on in the context of the interaction between life and the formal world, because this question comes from the concern of the change of the real society. Buddhism and Christianity have different opinions on this issue. On the one hand, they respectively put forward “Everything with form is unreal” (凡所有相皆是虚妄) and “there is nothing new under the sun”, which seem to deny the substantial impact of the changes of the formal world on human nature. On the other hand, from the perspective of doctrine, both of them focus on elevating individual “human nature” to “ideal human nature” (Buddha nature and divine nature), which can also be understood as human nature is changeable, showing the multiple dimensions of understanding human nature. Therefore, taking “potential-process-goal” as the basic framework to understand human nature can summarize the change and invariance of human nature in the formal world, so as to further reflect on the crisis of human nature in the new era.

Amy Donahue, Kennesaw State University

A Discussion of Pramāṇavāda’s Contemporary Potential

My students and I have developed a digital debate and argument archiving platform based on the Sanskrit logical and epistemological traditions of vāda and pramāṇavāda. My motivations for the project have been twofold – to demonstrate that these traditions can mitigate contemporary epistemic violences and injustices, as, for example, Kristie Dotson and Miranda Fricker conceive of these, and to develop tools to make these traditions accessible and relevant to students and generalists. Using the digital platform (“the Vāda Project”) in classes has strengthened my belief in the potential social epistemological applications of pramāṇavāda as well as my confidence in students’ and generalists’ abilities to learn the intricate mechanics of these traditions. More significantly, it has opened my eyes to a broad horizon of creative scholarly and pedagogical possibilities afforded by taking pramāṇavāda’s contemporary potential seriously.

In the proposed presentation, I will briefly introduce the Vāda Project platform and show how it can be used to track arguments, counterarguments, and testimonial and perceptual evidence to help to
organize public resistance against epistemic violences, such as false claims that the State of Georgia’s 2021 election reforms are not racially discriminatory. I then turn to a discussion of two student projects to indicate the breadth of creative possibilities afforded by exploring pramāṇavāda’s contemporary potential. The first is an outline of an app intended to improve users’ critical thinking skills and to teach them pramāṇavāda in their daily lives. The second is a classroom exercise based on the television show Jeopardy! Both illustrate that attending to pramāṇavāda’s contemporary potential opens a range of creative possibilities that can help to address pressing predicaments and attract students to the field.

Katherine Filbert, California State University, Stanislaus

Thinking in a Closed Circuit: Deleuze and Zhuangzi’s Critique of Recognition

Throughout his oeuvre, Gilles Deleuze engaged in a sustained critique of what he claimed were unquestioned pre-philosophical presuppositions concerning the activity of philosophizing. These ‘postulates’, he argued, provide an uninterrogated foundation on which philosophy—in its ‘European’ legacy—claimed to break with doxa. Outlined in his metaphilosophical schema, ‘the Image of Thought,’ these postulates presuppose a representational model of thinking which defines thought primarily in terms of recognition, its telos as knowledge, and the ‘enemy’ of good thinking as ‘error’ and the ‘transgression of limits’. At the heart of Deleuze’s critique and his search for a new ‘image’ lies a conception of thinking as requiring encounters which exceed recognition, as taking its structure from learning rather than knowledge, and as finding its enemy in an ongoing struggle with the inertia internal to recognition as a closed circuit. This threefold injunction—encounter, learning, overcoming inertia—is, I argue, a useful schema for interpreting questions about knowing and fasting the heart-mind in the Zhuangzi. Instead of taking questions in the text about knowledge to point to epistemological problems or advancing epistemological theses, I argue that such passages can be read fruitfully as raising metaphilosophical questions about the nature and conditions of thinking beyond recognition. Connecting the text’s recurring distinction between vastness and pettiness, stories of botched encounters with what exceeds recognized distinctions, and criticisms of the Ruist project of heart-mind formation as ‘stopping at the tallies,’ I argue that the Zhuangzi can be read as offering a different ‘image of thought’ concerned with diagnosing a particular ‘enemy’ of thought: the self-justifying valorization of petty thinking—identified with the Confucian project of knowing and learning—as if it were the highest achievement of thought. In this respect, the ideal of free and easy wandering expresses a Zhuangzian ‘image of thought’ as thinking beyond the bounds of recognition.

John Flowers, University of California, Northridge

Xunzi, Mengzi, and Algorithmic Bias as the Mirror of Improper Habit

Both Xunzi and Mengzi argue for the role of ritual in enabling the cultivation of human goodness. For Mengzi, ritual helps us cultivate our moral sprouts into the flowering of the upright and appropriate individual. For Xunzi, ritual restrains our more problematic, more base desires and allows us to become
moral through habituation of our conduct. In both thinkers, the role of habit is the shaping of that which is given unto us naturally.

Bearing this in mind, it is the position of this paper that both Mengzi and Xunzi would view contemporary examples of algorithmic bias across all areas from hiring, to policing, to medicine, as indictments of the failure of ritual practice in our contemporary era. Insofar as algorithmic platforms iterate upon the habits, or ritual conduct, of their creators or buried in their datasets, both a Mencian and a Xunzian analysis of algorithmic bias would locate the fault in the ritual conduct that organizes the society upon which the platform was trained.

**Katerina Gajdosova, Charles University Prague**

*Giving birth to the One: Chinese cosmological texts through Whiteheadian lenses*

Interpretation of early Chinese cosmological texts, including the excavated ones, is often distorted through the application of metaphysical models that are not relevant to them. When the texts speak about the One giving birth to a multiplicity of things, the One is usually understood vaguely as the first principle or the first stage of the creation of the cosmos. Yet, this model sees the One as a primary entity that splits up into multiple things and sacrifices its oneness in the process of creation. The model thus contradicts the texts that describe the One as being constantly present throughout the process of differentiation, and encourage the reader to ‘embrace the One’, ‘to become One’, in order to align with the greater cosmic process.

Whitehead’s process ontology provides an efficient conceptual apparatus to interpret the One-Many relation in terms of continuous becoming. It regards oneness as a necessary condition for multiplicity, and multiplicity as the result of an act of retention, i.e., the capacity to hold multiple facts in one prehension. It allows us to reinterpret the One as a creative, self-perpetuating subject manifested as an actual plurality, while continuously synthesizing the unity of self-experience. Through Whiteheadian lenses, the cosmological dynamics between One and Many in early Chinese texts becomes clearer, including its interconnectedness with the problem of subjectivity and human agency.

**Gyoel Gim, The Academy of Korean Studies**

*Rethinking the Formation and Development of Silhak in East Asia: With a Focus on the Establishment of the Concept of “East Asian Silhak” and Its Classification by Period*

From the 17th to the 18th century, East Asia saw the emergence of new academic trends, which called for social practice and reform, focusing more on practical aspects of the world than its theoretical aspects. These trends gave rise to Silhak實學 (Practical Learning) in Korea in the late Joseon dynasty, Qixue氣學 (Learning of the Material-Force) in China in the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, and Kogaku古學 (Ancient Learning) in Japan in the Edo period. To shed light on a theoretical consistency among them, going beyond a mere integration of them based on regional proximity, a concept of “East Asian Silhak” can be conceived in the context of strengthening the Confucian governance doctrine in the
17th and 18th centuries. However, in the 19th and 20th centuries, this academic trend, so-called East Asian Silhak, was manifested in the form of “pursuit of West-centered modernity” in the three East Asian countries. In view of this, it would be appropriate to understand it as a “modern transformation of East Asian Confucian thought” rather than as a theory newly developed in the context of Confucianism.

When attempting to incorporate the ideological transformation of Confucianism in East Asia in the 19th and 20th centuries into the concept of Silhak, there are issues such as: the conceptual confusion between Silhak of the late Joseon dynasty of Korea and Kaozhengxue 考證學 (Evidential Learning) of the Qing dynasty of China; and their pursuit of modernity based on the premise of Anti-Neo-Confucianism. In the light of these issues, this article seeks to highlight that the starting point of New Silhak in East Asia in the 21st century lies in the simultaneous relationship between Neo-Confucianism and Silhak, which can be interpreted from the perspective of the Confucian ideal of neisheng waiwang 內聖外王 (“inner sage and outer king”).

Arkadiusz Gut, The Nicolaus Copernicus University

The Chinese relational self and self-talk: A new cross-cultural perspective on the concept of the self

The unique characteristics of the Chinese self has been the object of both psychological and philosophical debates over many years. It has been argued that the Chinese concept of humanity requires the self to find out a sort of relational harmony with others (Shen, 2003, 2014, Wu 2007) and that the Chinese subjective experience of the world is characterized by the theme of the self in relation to others (Ho 1998; Hwang 2000). Moreover, motifs that are reflected in the cultural parameters of collectivism, such as reference to others, prioritizing the group’s aims, taking others' perspective, in-group orientation, inter-dependent self, high communal orientation, have been part of the culture, education, and thinking of China for centuries. These findings have been highly relevant to our study.

In our study, we focus on the question of whether people who belong to two different cultural groups (generally characterized as individualists with low communal orientation and independent self vs. collectivist with high communal orientation and interdependent self) will respond differently to self-talk questions that measure the levels of inner speech activation and intensity in different social and life contexts. The study was conducted in Europe and China and employed a self-talk questionnaire that measured four independent self-talk factors: Social Assessment, Self-Criticism, Self-Reinforcement, and Self-Management.

In the philosophical part of our study, we grounded the analysis in theories that claim that self-talk functions as a reaction to or anticipation of specific events (Mead 1962; Bandura 1986). Following this claim, we assumed that if our study revealed significant differences between the cultures in some of the self-talk factors, these will reflect different strategies of reacting to and anticipating events. Comparison of the two samples from Europe and China demonstrated, among others, that the Chinese scored significantly higher than Europeans in the factor of Social Assessment. Social Assessment concerns situations where we interact with others – socially assessing self-talk is similar to dialogues that include an imagined other. Our study showed that such situations lead to a significant increase in self-talk in the Chinese group. We argue that these results allow us to gain a novel psychological and philosophical
perspective on the self: It can be viewed in terms of regulation of our reactions to and anticipations of social situations, as opposed to the traditional view that employs static, descriptive categories, such as the interdependent self.

Sabrina Beishi Hao, University of Pittsburgh

Lao Zi’s Dao and Logical Negation

I propose a metaphysical understanding of Dao in Lao Zi’s monumental work, Dao De Jing, relating to the logical concept of negation as well as some set theoretic concepts in western philosophy. I observe that Lao Zi thinks that all properties in the world is binary in nature—that a property can always be negated, such as beauty and not beauty, long and not long. This is similar to set-theoretical definition of properties in western philosophy, and the negation can be understood as the complement set. However, Dao, as the ultimate and eternal truth of the world, cannot be negated. Lao Zi does not seem to think that the ultimate falsehood of the world exists, but one only deviates further and further from Dao. Relating to set theory, Dao can be understood as the universal set that has the complement set as the null set. Metaphysically, Dao should be understood as the most fundamental concept, and it cannot be negated and thus is one-valued truth in nature; everything in the world with binary nature is derived from the Oneness of Dao. Note that there are two different concepts of truth here: one is Dao, which is one-valued and metaphysically prior; the other one is the ordinary truth, which can be negated resulting in falsehood, and is thus two-valued and metaphysically derived. Unlike western logic, this metaphysical and set-theoretical picture does not run into the problem of paradoxes, since a paradox requires the concepts of truth and falsehood, and Dao is metaphysically prior to the concept of negation, no paradox can be formulated to impair the concept of Dao as the universal set.

Joseph Harroff, American University

Ambassadorial Ethics for Northeast Asian Politics to Come: Rethinking Rigid Nationalisms with Ecoaesthetics and a Plurisingingular conception of Pragmatic National-Regional Interest

Building off the energy and insights of these three illuminating essays, I will simply be appreciating the main points while suggesting further avenues for development of thinking and practices that might promote the ameliorative metamorphosis of the very concept of the political as iterated in the region of northeast Asia. It will also be an aspiration of mine in this responsive essay to develop a critical conception of “national-regional” interest that might align well with a tradition of pragmatic moral realism in international relations theory and the practice of ambassadorial discourse. A relationally constituted conception of interest will be developed to replace the ineffective discourse that relies upon a static and atomized notion of zero-sum advantages and disadvantages inherited from the Cold War era.
Dao and Data: Algorithmic Limitations and Limit

The Dao De Jing and the Zhuangzi both contain sophisticated critiques of language that remain relevant to any form of logical analysis, such as the algorithmic processes at the heart of machine learning and artificial intelligence. Daoist critiques of language emerge in both the Dao De Jing and the Zhuangzi from recognizing the intrinsic limitations of language and the implications these limits hold for conceptual analysis. In brief, both the Dao De Jing and the Zhuangzi view linguistic identity as intrinsically limited by the process of abstraction: any linguistic or conceptual abstraction creates an oversimplification of an irreducibly complex whole. The repercussions of this insight are fully realized by Zhuangzi, who demonstrates how any linguistic abstraction creates the possibility of its own self-negation. This intrinsically paradoxical characteristic of language presents important limitations to abstraction, disputation, and any form of algorithmic process.

This paper examines the limitations of language identified in the Dao De Jing and the Zhuangzi and their implications for machine learning. This paper then proposes a concept of “dialectical fragility,” a concept that may be useful in describing the conflicts between complex linguistic models and the constantly changing conditions they supposedly reflect.

Ultimately, both the Dao De Jing and Zhuangzi proscribe corrective values and therapeutic practices to reduce the dangers presented by linguistic practice and conceptual fixation.

These include “emptiness,” “wandering,” and “mirroring,” which function as central values that lend to reinterpretation across contexts. As such these values connect the linguistic criticisms in the Dao De Jing and Zhuangzi to the larger ethical visions of these texts. The paper concludes by considering the general Daoist emphasis on relinquishing anthropocentric perspectives and mechanisms of control, and the potential consequences this vision holds for modern society and machine learning.
energy—a kind of bequethal or inheritance of value for future biotic communities to come. This is a part of a symbiont network countering the totalitarian community politics of identity historically operative in the Northeast Asian region. Can we decompose the nation-state based politics of identity in this region? And what would a decompositional politics of the future look like? What can we hope for?

Yuki Imoto, Keio University

Decentring Mindfulness and Compassion-Based Learning

This paper will consider the notion of decentring from multidisciplinary and comparative perspectives, and explore its role in the process of implementing mindfulness and compassion-based school programs. I focus on the SEE Learning Program, a K-12 comprehensive holistic program developed by scientists and Buddhist scholars at Emory University in the US, and currently being implemented in the Japanese context. The SEE Learning Program is based upon a framework, comprised of three domains - the personal, social and systemic, and three dimensions - attention, compassion and engagement. The domains and dimensions together form a grid with nine components - each component representing a competency to be cultivated through study, reflection and embodied practice. I consider how decentring facilitates this framework into practice, through first and second-person reflection as teacher, administrator, translator and anthropologist. Reflecting on the implementation of such programs in Japan, I consider how to make sense of the seeming paradox of bringing mindfulness and compassion into skills-oriented, techno-individualizing school contexts and the possibility for a decentred, mu-shin (no-mind)-based learning space to emerge.

Emma Irwin-Herzog, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa

Dissolving the "Paradox of Elimination" in Advaita Vedānta

Gasparri (2020) characterizes Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta, the primary thesis of which is that Brahman (universal non-dual consciousness) alone is real, as eliminivist and anti-realist about the phenomenal world, including subjects of experience. Accordingly, Gasparri identifies a paradox of elimination: if we acknowledge that the phenomenal world appears, we antecedently grant that there is something other than unqualified awareness. If, on the other hand, we start off with a radical monistic claim, “razoring the ontology to a unique unqualified awareness”, we jeopardize our ability to acknowledge the appearance of the phenomenal world (Gasparri 2020, 81). In this paper, I argue that there is no such paradox in Advaita Vedānta. First and foremost, Śaṅkara is not eliminivist or anti-realist in the way Gasparri thinks. In Advaita, the phenomenal world (jagat) is categorized as false (mithyā). To be false, in the idiosyncratic Advaitic context, is to be indeterminable (anirvacanīya) as either real (sat) or unreal (asat). I offer an extended analysis of the Advaitic concept of falsity (mithātvā) to resist the idea that that Śaṅkara’s commitments are eliminivist or anti-realist. Moreover, I dissolve Gasparri’s paradox of elimination by analyzing key features of the theoretical structure of Advaita Vedānta: to acknowledge that the phenomenal world appears is not to antecedently grant that there is something other than unqualified awareness, and there is no chance of assuming a radical monistic thesis. The Advaitin starts
with analysis of our worldly, everyday life (lokavyāvahāra), acknowledges its appearance, and moves towards grasp of the reality of universal non-dual consciousness through that analysis. Moreover, Śaṅkara’s ontology is not razor thin. The Advaitin distinguishes between three levels of being: reality, appearance or falsity (mithyātva), and unreality. The view that emerges from the Advaitic analysis of lokavyāvahāra comfortably accommodates the appearance (falsity) of the phenomenal world.

Puthiran Jeyapalasingham, University of Ottawa

The Perfection of Generosity and the Realization of Emptiness in Śāntideva

Śāntideva, in his Bodhicaryāvatāra (henceforth, BCA), presents the six perfections (pāramitā) as the conduct for a bodhisattva – a being who strives for enlightenment for the sake of other beings. Cultivating the perfections leads the bodhisattva to enlightenment: as mentioned in BCA IX.1, the first five perfections are taught for the sake of wisdom, the possession of which entails enlightenment. For Śāntideva, wisdom consists of a realization of the nature of reality, which is ‘emptiness’ (śūnyatā). Thus, a thorough understanding of the perfections must take into account their relation to the realization of emptiness. To show this relation, we will present the first of the six perfections, generosity (dāna). Based on passages from BCA, we will show that the nature of generosity is a mental disposition (citta). We will then argue that there is a relation between cultivating this disposition and the realization of emptiness by showing how the cultivation relates to non-self, or selflessness (anātman), that is, emptiness as it pertains to the nature of the self. Understanding this relation requires noting the elimination of greed (lobha), an affliction which obstructs generosity. We will show that as the bodhisattva cultivates generosity and eliminates his greed, he lessens his sense of self, for greed is rooted in a sense of self. By lessening his sense of self, he approaches the full realization of selflessness of persons, that is, he approaches wisdom. In this regard, the perfections lead to wisdom through cultivating wisdom itself, though in a limited scope. The cultivation of generosity will be presented while incorporating this idea: generosity is a necessary aspect of wisdom, such that when the bodhisattva cultivates generosity, he cultivates an understanding of emptiness.

David Kim, University of San Francisco

Hegemony for Confucians

Confucianism has offered sympathetic accounts of social hierarchy, like parent-child and teacher-student relations, and their necessity in a society. Recent Confucian political theorists, like Joseph Chan, Daniel Bell, and many others, focus on hierarchies that concern virtue or merit and that express mutual trust and goodwill, and they contend that such hierarchies can be valued while pernicious and oppressive forms of subordination, like slavery, are rejected.

This essay examines subtle corruptions of Confucian social hierarchies due to their acquiring hegemonically, as opposed to barbarically, oppressive configurations. It begins with a discussion of the hegemony-coercion distinction, loosely inspired by the work of Antonio Gramsci but characterized here in language that does not require a commitment to Marxism and will be familiar to comparative moral
and political philosophers. Classical Confucian concepts, like Mengzian ren and yi and Xunzian li, can be caught up in hegemonic subordination, and many Confucian theorists have underestimated these dangers. But illumination can proceed in the other direction. Confucianism offers a deep understanding of how robust is the relation between morality and sociality, and this perspective can be extended to illuminate moral psychological and epistemic dynamics of hegemony that are insufficiently explored in critical theory.

Sudeep Raj Kumar, Hindu College, University of Delhi

*Buddhaghosa’s model of Temporality seen through the prism of Bergson’s Duration*

The broad objective of this paper is to expound the model of temporal awareness as per Buddhaghosa and compare it with Bergson’s account of duration. As per Buddhaghosa, the notions of time, consciousness, and causation are inter-related. Accordingly, to understand the nature of temporal consciousness, it is required that a moment of consciousness is unpacked, its constituents analysed, and its structuring process penetrated, that is, how momentary mental events are related to each other in a way that leads to an experience of succession and duration.

The paper will be divided into three sections. The aim of the first section is to show that mental events, for Buddhaghosa, are not discrete, independent entities but are dependently originated. The aspect of dependent origination is further illustrated through paṭiccasamuppāda and paṭṭhāna. In the second section, the constitution of temporality as per Bergson is discussed. Henri Bergson also subscribes to the view that mental events are not discrete and disconnected; rather, they are fused together in interpenetrating causal relationships. Thus, Bergson’s model of temporality, which describes the movement of fused consciousness as a heterogeneous multiplicity rather than a discrete one, provides a helpful framework for interpreting Buddhaghosa’s model of temporality. In the final section, Buddhaghosa’s model of time-consciousness is discussed by elucidating the structure of the momentary citta (consciousness). Further, the tension that prevails between the momentary and the durational level aspect of consciousness and between simultaneity and succession is discussed vis-à-vis temporal awareness. Buddhaghosa argues that the experience of duration is fundamental to consciousness, grounded in moments of consciousness rather than being opposed to them. It is posited that, in Buddhaghosa, there is a construction of temporal experience but one that is not opposed with the real duration; unlike in Bergson, where a distinction seems to be made between the ultimate reality of duration when contrasted with the construction or projection of continuity based upon moments of consciousness.
Mary Jeanne Larrabee, DePaul University

What way brings the One or the Many? – A question for Buddhists and Meister Eckhart, with stories of realization.

One could say there are two ways to fall into the Absolute of Buddhism or the God of the Abrahamic religions. For each of these, the practices point to something like a quiet sitting with a leaning “toward” the core reality/Reality, taking the practitioner in one of two directions or ways. One way is to fall into a stillness and the other is to fall into an abundance of everything that is, seemingly beauty gone mad in a million directions. The stillness, as one takes it in, appears to some as empty or nothing (perhaps ‘Emptiness’ or ‘Nothingness’) and to yet others an experiential bliss. These terms are familiar to those who are practitioners or scholars of one or another of the Buddhist Schools, as is the crazy joy in seeing the beauty of the myriad things. They may not be as familiar to practitioners of Christian meditative schools, although stillness is in the terminology for such Christian prayer.

My essay compares these two ways of answering the more fundamental question about a final outcome of human existence (there are others). As understood in Buddhist writings on the Four Truths, it is the cessation of suffering as attainment of full realization; for the Neoplatonist philosophy of Meister Eckhart it was an entry “into the Godhead”—and, along with God—as a unity. I use resources for pointing to experiences of this final outcome. One is a story of it told metaphorically in the tale of the salt doll who meets the ocean and dissolves, while the other draws from poems of early Buddhist women practitioners attesting to shifts towards realization. Both sets of ideas, in being tested against the experiential/narrative sources, are questioned for how well such a “fall” as they describe it can actually bring a release from suffering.

Zhen Liang, Sweet Briar College

The Key to Practicing Li 禮 and Achieving Ren 仁: Cheng 誠 in Zhongyong 中庸 and Song Neo-Confucian Texts

Besides the usual hermeneutical difficulties any revival movement might encounter, the Neo-Confucianists of Song dynasty China (960-1279) face a unique challenge: how to practice li (rites). Practicing li (rites) is indispensable for one’s cultivation as a Junzi 君子 and achieving ren (authoritative humanity, goodness) in both the Analects and Mengzi. However, for Song Confucianists who lived more than a millennium later, following rites practiced by Confucius and Mengzi, i.e. zhouli 周禮, are both impractical and inappropriate. Furthermore, blind adherence to the li of the past without properly adjusting it to fit one’s current situation is against the teachings of Confucianism. In this paper, I present Song Confucianists’ solution to the problem through analyzing their revival and further development of the concept of cheng 誠 from Zhongyong 中庸.

I argue that the concept of cheng designates the process of individuation for Song Confucianists, and it has a three-fold structure: 1) as sincerity, 2) as authenticity, and 3) as integration. As sincerity, Cheng, first and foremost, signifies an epistemological honesty. Secondly, cheng is the authentic aspect of the process of individualization. As authenticity, cheng names the personalization of the fixed rules of
conduct required to fulfill one’s own natural tendencies (xing性). Finally, cheng speaks of the integrative aspect of individualization. To illustrate cheng as integration, I analyze the passage titled “Knowing Ren” (識仁篇) by Cheng Hao 程颢, in which Cheng Hao discusses how the lack of cheng results in “the opposition of two,” i.e., the failure of integrating things (wu物) and me (wo我).

Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

The Zhuangzi on the Large as the Free: A Monistic Interpretation

A prevalent image in the Zhuangzi’s (莊子) first chapter “Free and Easy Wandering (Xiaoyaoyou逍遥游)” is the image of the large: a large fish, a large bird, a large gourd, a large tree. But what is the connection between such largeness and the sort of free and easy wandering that the Zhuangzi holds in such high regard?

Extant interpretations face various difficulties. Some take the stories of the useless gourd and tree as prompting us to see things more creatively (for example Wong (2009, 576); Wu (1990, 78)). But this doesn’t explain why Zhuangzi doesn’t choose useless small objects. Others see them as teaching that being useless is a way of preserving one’s life (for example, Coutinho (2004, 74); Li (2009, sec. 2)). But this conflicts with Huizi’s destruction of the gourd in the end. As for the large fish and bird, Guo Xiang 郭象 interprets the perspectives of the large and small as equally good. But this conflicts with Zhuangzi’s portrayal of the large perspective as being superior. Others take the flying bird to represent the sage whose perspective soars beyond mundane perspectives (for example, Graham (1987: 43); Allinson (1989: 43)). But this has trouble explaining why the large gourd should represent the sage’s transcendent perspective.

I instead argue that the images represent Zhuangzi’s monistic philosophy where only the universe as a whole objectively exists. The large objects thus represent that universe, and the freedom that is displayed is the freedom of those who identify with the universe. The perceived uselessness of the gourd and tree refers to the common person’s perception that such a monistic teaching is useless because it involves seeing the world in a way that is counterproductive to the common person’s narrow goals.

Masaki Matsubara, University of Tsukuba

When expression is emerged from oneself by 'Ba': First-person view of co-creative embodied practice

Co-creative body movements, such as Kokido’s Theatrework and Steiner’s Eurythmy, bring about unconscious body interactions. As a result, the physical expressions naturally emerge from the co-creative space, allowing one to become aware of one's own way of being and the perspectives of others. Based on my own experiences of theatrework and eurythmy, this paper adopts a first-person research (Suwa 2013) approach to describe how my body resonates with others, how my expression is naturally emerged by the power of the field, and how I have reached self-integration. The discussion will reconsider notions "場(Ba)", "おのずから(emergence from self by Ba)," and "みずから(expressed from
SACP 2023 Annual Meeting

Presentation Abstracts

oneself into Ba)” based on ancient Japanese language, and reflect on the role of embodied practices towards collaborations across differences.

Thomas Michael, Beijing Normal University

Comparing Three Early Versions of the Order of Heaven, Earth, and the Dao from Daodejing Chapter 25

Since its appearance more than two thousand years ago, the Daodejing has served as a foundational text in the religious and philosophical traditions of China and the Far East. The 1992 discovery of an ancient edition of the Daodejing, called the Guodian Laozi, shows an important set of differences in thought and content compared to the received text, and our recognition of them fundamentally alters our understanding of the Daodejing's early textual history. Because we are now, thirty years later, in a better position to understand how and why the text underwent such startling changes, we can begin to differentiate independent versions of the Daodejing as it formed in the early history of Daoism. This paper looks at three early versions traditionally attributed to Laozi, to Heshang Gong, and to Zhang Daoling, and it approaches their religious and philosophical differences by comparing their separate orderings of Heaven, Earth, and the Dao from Daodejing chapter 25. This comparison intends to bring out the substantial philosophical and religious differences in these separate versions thereby to gain a clearer view of the early development of Daoism.

Namrata Narula, University of Cambridge

The Adhyāsa of Gender; Comparative Notes on Performativity and Superimposition

The central aim of this paper presentation is to examine Śaṅkara’s (750 CE) account of worldly experience in dialogical conversation with Judith Butler's conception of gendered subjectivity as performatively produced. Butler argues that there is no universally available essence of gender/sex that is shared across all gendered subjects, rather, individual subjects are performatively produced through reiterative acts and utterances that project gender categories as ontologically pre-given. From his own distinctive socio-ritual perspective, the ancient Indic philosopher Śaṅkara also argues that the individualized mind-body (jīva) has no ontological integrity; the sense of its stability is produced through the experience-founding error of superimposition (adhyāsa) which mistakenly equates the constancy of one's being (ātman) with the finite mutable traits of one’s particularized embodiment (jīvatva). I will argue that these two conceptions of identity constitution — performativity and superimposition — share key resonances, and further, that the divergences between them can be productive sites for generating new feminist-decolonial perspectives on subjectivity. While Butler orients us towards reading gender into Śaṅkara’s accounts of worldly experience, Śaṅkara helps us imagine conceptions of subjectivity that do not arise in (post)Kantian and (post)Cartesian frameworks, and are therefore unencumbered by key assumptions of contemporary philosophical scholarship. I will thus argue that reading Śaṅkara and Butler together in this manner can be mutually transformative for the respective frameworks that they inhabit and defend.
SACP 2023 Annual Meeting

Presentation Abstracts

**Sai Ying Ng, The Graduate Center, CUNY**

*Trust Your Elders: Xiao and Williams’s Ethical Knowledge in Confucian Ethical Communities*

For Ames (2021), *xiao* 孝, often translated as ‘filial piety’ or ‘family reverence’, is (perhaps) the primary ethical imperative in Confucian role ethics. The importance Ames attributes *xiao* arises from his fundamental presupposition of relationally constituted selves, which Ames sees as an alternative basis for ethical theorizing: rather than presume an individual self as the basis for what one ought to do, as Bernard Williams does, Ames begins with the complex network of social relationships which underlies any one individual’s decision to act. Framed as alternatives to each other, Ames and Williams seem to offer mutually exclusive frameworks for ethical theorizing. In this paper, I challenge this dichotomy by highlighting a possible role for *xiao*, which I render as familial trust, in Williams’s account of ethical knowledge under an advisor model. I argue that family life in Confucian ethical communities are equivalent to Williams’s advisor model, such that normative claims of the form ‘A ought to φ’ are passed down from parents—a child’s advisors by default—and accepted as ethical knowledge on the grounds that a child trusts his or her parents to know who he or she is. This trust exhibits itself as *xiao*, which amounts to no more than the deference a child has towards his or her parents as ethical advisors. The upshot: a Confucian emphasis on relationality between individuals which is compatible with Williams’s vision of ethical life, but a vision that is tweaked to reflect the trust and deference individuals place in their elders when it comes to accepting certain normative claims as ethical knowledge.

**Ian Nicolay, UH Mānoa/SUNY Stony Brook**

*Bhāvanā: Creative Imagination in Indian Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā Philosophy*

Many studies of imagination in the religious and philosophical traditions of classical India focus upon the Sanskrit term *kalpanā* (conceptualization.) But David Shulman’s pioneering study *More than Real* draws attention to the—closely-related, but importantly-distinct—concept of *bhāvanā* as a culturally-specific conception of imagination. *Bhāvanā* is an active noun derived from the causative form of the verb root *bhū* (to be); in its most literal sense the term denotes a process of bringing-into-being or, in a word, creation. Shulman focuses upon the Sanskrit poeticians’ understanding of poetic creativity, but I submit that it is identifiably the same culturally specific—and yet, interculturally comparable—conception of imagination behind two other prominent uses of the term as well.

One, within the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy, refers to the process of verbal comprehension— as in Maṇḍanamiśra’s *Bhāvanāviveka* “Analysis of Bhāvanā”. The other, which spans the various schools of Indian Buddhism, denotes a range of contemplative spiritual practices—as in Kamalaśīla’s *Bhāvanākrama* “Sequence of Bhāvanā”. (Incidentally, these two authors happen to be approximate contemporaries.)

After summarizing Shulman’s conclusions on *bhāvanā* as poetic creative imagination, this talk will give an overview of the concept of *bhāvanā* within Mīmāṃsā philosophy and Indian Buddhism respectively. As a matter of convenience, I will focus on these two texts— Bhāvanāviveka and Bhāvanākrama—and discuss
the broader traditions only as needed for context. The overall purpose of the talk is to articulate a
general conception of bhāvanā based on these three uses of the term.

Monika Nowakowska, University of Warsaw

*Dangers of borrowing terms from “dead languages” – the case of kāma*

South Asia is notorious for its ambiguous, superficially timeless, cultural lexicon the conceptual content
of which, however, in fact kept changing with speakers and time, despite deceptively retaining its almost
unchanged sound form. This formal identity, often played out successfully by various authors through
the ages, has also given rise to many difficulties in correctly interpreting different texts of culture, and
even more so philosophical ones. It encouraged reading some terms in an unchanging or analogous way,
regardless of their respective contexts and the fact that their semantic content as meant among their
users, their epochs and traditions might have dramatically varied. Therefore, reaching today for such
terminology beyond time and culture seems all the riskier and more surprising. The case under analysis
in this paper is Sanskrit term kāma, important not only for the Indian ethics, but also ontology and
epistemology. Its correct understanding is often made obscured by Western categories of love. Quite
recently, A.P. Fiske has borrowed the term as a lexeme “from a dead language” to denote a new
psychological construct. The point of the borrowing from Sanskrit was to avoid ambiguity and confusion,
yet, the result, as I argue, has only multiplied problems. In the paper, I discuss shortly the philosophical
meanings of the term kāma, point out its most influential historically Western appropriations, and
consider the ethical and rhetorical dimensions of using it anew today.

Jea Sophia Oh, West Chester University of Pennsylvania

*One, Many, and Creativity: Comparing Donghak and Process Thought in terms of Reverence toward
Nature*

This study deals with the hybridity of Donghak (東學, eastern learning) which was influenced by the
three major East Asian philosophies (Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism) as well as by Christianity
with the unique Korean cultural life-centered cosmology, salim (enlivening), that stands for reverence
toward life and creation. The Donghak dialectics is a combination of the nonduality [不二] of Buddhism,
and the yin-yang [陰陽] of Confucianism, as well as the Korean traditional concept of han [한, one]. One
can also observe that the holistic non-duality in Donghak was influenced by the Korean non-dualistic
Mahayana Buddhism, the notion of reverence from Confucianism, and the practice of doing non-doing
as being actually Daoistic. Hanul is ‘inter-becoming’ of the divine presence which is similar to the process
thinker’s God in process, e.g., Catherine Keller’s ‘intercarnation’. Hanul through three forms of reverence
(敬げ영 toward heaven, human beings, and myriad things) can be comparable to the Whiteheadian
Ultimate as One, Many, and Creativity. This study suggests us to rethink the relational ethics of humans
and earth/earthly things. We should rethink postcolonial/colonial subalternization of nature by human
domination of earth’s ecosystems.
Christopher Paone, Western Connecticut State University

Life After Destruction: Jayarāśi and Cārvāka Ethics

Scholars disagree about Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa (ca. 8th cen. – 9th cen. CE) and his singular treatise Tattvopaplavasimha (Lion of the Destruction of Principles). At issue is how to reconcile the destructive arguments of Jayarāśi’s treatise with his apparent adherence to Cārvāka/Lokāyata (classical Indian materialism). Some scholars argue that Jayarāśi’s skeptical arguments are reason to exclude him from the school. Others regard his skepticism as a reason to think Cārvāka/Lokāyata exhibited a diversity of views with common opponents. Still others have sought to discover materialist commitments underlying his skepticism. In this presentation, I suggest we may find a resolution to this impasse by considering the practical results of Jayarāśi’s approach. Jayarāśi’s skeptical arguments serve a certain philosophical way of life that produces pleasure free from suffering caused by dogmatic thought, a goal shared with Cārvāka/Lokāyata.

Hyunwoo Park, Seoul National University

De 德 and Ulterior Motives

This paper aims to refute the paradox suggested by Nivison, which is that the expectation of reciprocity can hinder the expected benefits of generosity. However, this paradox cannot fully explain why the makers of Shang oracle bone and Western Zhou bronze inscriptions were not reluctant to reveal what they expected from the beneficiary. In the inscriptions, "de" refers to providing help to others, or a mental/psychological capacity to help others, and it is believed to be reciprocated by the beneficiary. Because of this reciprocation, they believed that they should practice or demonstrate de, which disproves the paradox suggested by Nivison. Even if there is an intention to create a sense of gratitude or obtain reciprocation, if the primary motive is to help others for their own wellbeing and this motive is capable of leading to the behavior even in the absence of the other motives, then the help provided by such complex motives can still be considered generous. In addition, it is possible that both parties benefit from the exchange even when the beneficiary eventually reciprocate the help. Moreover, according to some anthropological and psychological research, an action motivated solely by selfish desires can still incur a debt of gratitude.

Iljoon Park, Wonkwang University

A Northeast Asian Political Community to Come and Mushroom Religion: Many becomes One with Dongbysangsangu (同病上求) and Mychorrizal Networking as Method

This study recognizes Northeast Asia as a real geopolitical locale and a vital yet unfinished concept of the political. Since Northeast Asia has not yet arrived fully in its political possibilities it’s a concept ‘to come’. The term Northeast Asia itself is a name that reflects the historical map-making sensibilities and colonial perspectives of Westerners. Modern Asian intellectuals have tended to emphasize modernization by promoting self-strengthening of persons and the nation(自強論). However, the total invasion of Asia by
the Meiji Japanese Empire strengthened the ideology that 'the nation must be strong in order to survive', and the traces of this historical trauma are still present in many of the political sentiments circling within post-colonial Korea, China and Japan. Aren’t Northeast Asians then living in a dream of a winner-takes-all future, conscious of and suspicious of each other as competitors rather than empathizing with and understanding each other’s pain and striving to be mutually embracing of each other's aspirations and vulnerabilities? What and how could we learn from an ancient Korean scholar’s wisdom, which we Northeast Asians can weave each other into a religiosity of sympathy? This study finds an anthropo-cosmological common ground of Northeast Asia in the concept of “dongbyungsanggu” (同病上求) which means that we can save each other through the same pain, used by a Goryeo scholar, Lee Kyu-bo. The other major component of this essay is to think about actors and actants in a mychorrizal network theory of religion and politics that goes beyond tap-root and rhizomatic metaphors by foregrounding a fungus-metaphor that shows that communal being is an act of reaching out, connecting, and associating with others, including other species. Such communal sporadic becoming and fungal being always entails an exertion of unique plurisingular agencies underground with radicles of plant and fungi living together by offering mineral nutrients they extract from rocks and soils and in return by receiving carbon nutrients plants produce through photosynthesis. This has been a real model of symbiosis when the term was coined in the first place. It will be the author’s contention and dream that we can realize a more harmonious and peaceful co-existence in Northeast Asia beyond the old and tired dichotimizations and rifts created by the monolithic Nation State.

Roshni Patel, Lake Forest College

Care and Compassion as a Morally Transformative Mental State

The notions of both Buddhist compassion and care in feminist care ethics impel regard for another’s suffering and responsiveness to their inherently dependent status. Inspired by some scholars’ recent translation of karunā as care, this paper links these concepts in order to argue for the ethical importance of the mental state that is a common aspect to both terms. While feminist care ethics has responsibly established that “care” must motivate care work benefiting the recipient of care, this point of emphasis has left the transformative functions of care upon the one caring underdeveloped. The inward dimensions of the Buddhist compassion helps us attribute moral value to care/compassion in cases when certain forms of responsive action are beyond one’s realistic capacity or the preferences of the person who receives our care. I argue that this enlarges possibilities for who can participate in this moral quality and in which contexts.

I rely on two Buddhist ideas to adhere moral value to these mental states of care and compassion. First, I appeal to tenets in Yogācāra philosophy related to the “storehouse consciousness,” an aspect of our consciousness built by our previous experiences. In addition to helping us appreciate the profound influence of our own actions and experiences upon our present experiencing, this concept also provides an important basis for the possibility of transformation. Thus, engaging in care and compassion is hugely important to one’s becoming, in addition to one’s current ethicality. Secondly, I turn to the Mahāyāna development of compassion as entangled with transforming one’s self-relation. The principle of a
conjoined development of wisdom and compassion exhibits that the more one is able to realize that one’s being is permeated with emptiness, the more one is able to take up the mantle of compassion.

Chiara Robbiano, University College Utrecht, Utrecht University

"You have no new nest in which to settle" – developing decentered belonging at university, in dialogue with Dōgen

Dōgen explains that to cultivate oneself means to become actualised by multiple phenomena, after letting go of the assumption of a permanent self, of mind-body separation and self-and-other separation (Genjōkōan). I call this process decentring, and I argue that it is necessary towards academic excellence and social justice, both of which are enhanced when a multiplicity of frameworks are brought together by different people. Decentring involves becoming aware of the habitual frameworks not only of one’s discipline, but also of one’s own body-and-mind; not only appreciating frameworks of other disciplines, but also learning to travel to other worlds (Lugones 1987) of meanings, valuing, and experiencing, and practising to look through the eyes of others: “You should study the green mountains, using numerous worlds as your standards. You should clearly examine the green mountains’ walking and your own walking” (Dōgen, Sansui-kyō, Tanahashi 1985: 98) and learn “in practice of water seeing water” (Dōgen, Sansui-Kyō, Nishijima and Cross 1994: 145).

Decentring facilitates co-creation, which always happens in a place, together with other beings. It is by responding to the calls of others, in the place we share with them, that we can develop shared practices and insights. Dōgen gives examples of creative exchanges between teacher and students that seem unrestricted by any rule (Bukkōjōji), and of seemingly unrestricted movement of fish and birds (Genjōkōan). However, the question and the place to which they respond are the starting points that frame and allow their seemingly unrestricted and creative responses.

What embodied practices might help different people with different styles of movement (Krueger 2021) find themselves together in a place experienced “as a place for the hosting of others, the hosting and weaving of difference” (Job and Vazquez 2023), and engage in co-creation, as a dynamic process of collaboration and negotiation across differences?
SACP 2023 Annual Meeting
Presentation Abstracts

Dawid Rogacz, Adam Mickiewicz University

What Divides into What, and Why: On Metaphysical Foundations of Dengism

The question of the unity of antagonisms was one of the unsolved issues of Maoist dialectics. Mao’s rejection of the law of double negation had, in addition, profound implications for his political and historical thought. The joint effort of Chinese Communists to defend the genuinely Marxist nature of Mao’s view of contradiction culminated in the famous “One Divides into Two” (yi fen wei 二) debate (1964), whose impact extended even to Western thought (e.g., Alain Badiou). After summarizing the essence of these controversies, the paper focuses on its 1979 spin, which, after the rehabilitation of then-condemned Yang Xianzhen (who opted for the idea of “Two United in One”), led to the major reformulation of Sino-Marxist dialectics. While some positions were nothing but apologies of either of these two options, or tried to reconcile them (with various degrees) within the dialectical framework, other voices rejected both of them as vulgar (non-dialectical) or treated the whole debate as irrelevant, for instance in the face of the allegedly more urgent question of the relationship between balance and imbalance. In all these cases, however, as it shall be shown, the arguments served as metonymies for designing the “ontological frames” for the socialist modernization (along with its modest embrace of capitalism). As a side effect, this led to the rethinking and reappraisal of classical Chinese metaphysics, particularly the Daoist and Yijing dialectics, thereby shifting the interest of Chinese philosophers from somewhat drained Marxist formulas towards an authentic interest in classical Chinese thought. It was within this encounter, I argue, that the Dengist program of social and historical change received its metaphysical foundation.

Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, University of Hawai‘i - West O‘ahu

“The Singular Genealogy of Philosophy”

My presentation will center on the prevalent, institutional practice that teaches the history of philosophy as singularly and exclusively western. The singularity of the genealogy of philosophy in turn raises the question of the legitimacy and necessity of teaching anything else other than western philosophy. The existence of the field of Comparative Philosophy immediately becomes suspect; it is either a field with substandard philosophants or a field treated as a natural by-product of western influence on the non-western world that retroactively applies the label of “philosophy” to their own indigenous traditions. Needless to say, neither of these views is conductive to the development of the field of Comparative Philosophy that is perpetually subjugated to the lesser status compared to western philosophy viewed as philosophy proper. However this view of philosophy as singularly and exclusively western has its own revisionist inception in the late 18th and early 19th century with the rise of race theory. I will explore the origin of this revisionist history of philosophy by examining, in particular, Hegel’s lecture on the history of philosophy, Kant’s race theory and Hume’s essay on the national characters as a starting point to undo the myth of philosophy as an exclusively western practice, and thereby open up the possibility of a more inclusive view of philosophy without borders.
Agnieszka Rostalska, Ghent University

**Political realist aiming at success? A philosophical reconsideration of “Arthaśāstra”**

This paper is a philosophical consideration of the first and most prominent Indian treatise on statecraft - the "Arthaśāstra" (AŚ). As the recent philological scholarship suggests (McClish 2019, Olivelle 2013, Bronkhorst 2011) [against what is repeatedly evoked in the other secondary literature], it was not a single-authored treatise by Kautilya, nor was he a Brahmin and political advisor of the emperor Chandragupta Maurya. Furthermore, its content underwent several stages of redactions and interpolations.

Drawing upon current research, I examine the fundamental philosophical concepts underpinning the text’s layers, with their meaning and context in the social and political realm of 1-2nd century CE India. First, I refer to the Jain, Buddhist, and Brahminica l identities, which directly and indirectly appear in the text and shape the social and political context at the time of AŚ’s redaction. Second, I argue that the alleged author(s) of the AŚ was not a scrupulous political realist mainly concerned with power and motivated by self-interest, as is occasionally maintained in the secondary literature suggesting the Machiavellian alignment (Boesche 2002). Instead, he was a thinker committed to the well-being of all and a supporter of the harmonious functioning of a diverse society.

My inquiry further examines the weight of the philosophical device known as "end-goals of life," which provides value orientation both for the individual and society at large. Moreover, I propose a novel classification of laws and principles governing conduct and sound praxis, leading to success: duty of the ruler, individual duty, and the restraint of common vices. The prescriptions and political directives offered in the treatise are measures contributing to collective success (artha) and promotion of the well-being, flourishing, and harmony of a cosmopolitan community.

Jongwoo Ryu, Arizona State University

**Individualization or Assimilation: A Comparison of Parents-Child Relationships in the Stories of Oedipus and Shun**

As can be seen in Aristotle’s works, in the Greek tradition of thought, a son is recognized as an equal member of the polis as his father when he reaches a certain age. This becomes a basis for Oedipus to compete with Laius in the Oedipus myth. Oedipus is a story of a man’s coming of age. This story delineates how a son who had been subordinate to his father won the competition against him, and became an individual. However, filial piety in East Asia restrains a son for life, telling him that a son’s status cannot be restored to the degree of his father. The rivalry between two generations has rarely occurred in Chinese tradition. While the Oedipus story implies equal rights between father and son, that the father and son are contenders with equal rights was unimaginable in China. Even if the son was defiant, he was destined to be subdued and disciplined by the father as in the story of Nezha 哪吒. If the story of Oedipus is the archetype of Western thought, the tale of Shun 舜 might be that of Chinese thought. In the story, there is no rivalry between Shun and his father since they do not have equal rights. Even after Shun grew up and got married, he was always subordinate to his father. The two can never be
contenders with equal rights. While the parents-child relationship of the Western tradition is characterized by the potential rivalry between the two, that of the Chinese tradition is characterized by child’s unconditional obedience to his parents.

Neela Bhattacharya Saxena, Nassau Community College

*Vajra Clarity of Bernardo’s Mind: A Tantric Engagement with Analytical Idealism*

“Materialism is baloney” declares Bernardo Kastrup, a thinker of the most ageless kind who is capable of shining light on the roots of our being; hence radical. With two PhDs, in computer engineering and philosophy of mind, his is a formidable intellect to contend with, and yet he also declares Bernardo Kastrup does not exist and is merely a process, a Kastruping. In dialogue with Rupert Spira, a master nondualist, or Igor Kufayev, a Shaiva Tantric guru, Kastrup sounds like a Upanishadic Rishi who experiences pure consciousness and declares “I am that.” When he teaches his analytic idealism, he is a maestro with the clarity of mind that I have only glimpsed in Tantric circles, Buddhist, and Hinduist.

Bernardo Kastrup in one fell swoop demolishes materialism. He defines materialism or physicalism as the belief system that imagines a mindless external objective world. By unveiling the foundational mistake within the materialist paradigm he reveals the difference between science whose domain has been the behavior of nature and its functional predictability, and physicalism which pretends to know what nature is, as mere matter with no mind. He brings our subjectivity to the center of our dialogue, but rejects the solipsism of some forms of idealism which like the mistaken understanding of Maya makes the world unreal. Kastrup reaches his conclusions about all-pervasive consciousness using cutting-edge science and supreme reason which arises according to Tantric Buddhism when the stillness of being reveals the spotless mind sky. At this stage, the razor-sharp intellect blossoms with Vajra clarity and resonates with the profound tenderness of the heart. This paper will examine his views from a Shakta and Vajrayana Tantric perspective to add an Indic flavor for the introspective mind to taste the deep wisdom of Bernardo’s idealism.

Nastazja Stoch, University of Warsaw

*The Gongsun Longzi and proper objects of perception*

This paper aims to elaborate on the meaning of the Gongsun Longzi’s fifth chapter, the “Dialogue on hardness and whiteness” (Jiān bái lùn 堅白論), from a perspective of philosophy of perception. The Dialogue’s proposition is that hardness, whiteness, and stone make two instead of three. Its main argument is to separate hardness from whiteness on the ground that the two properties of a stone are not simultaneously accessible to human perceptual experiences due to separate senses of touch and sight. Interpretations of the Dialogue made so far have identified the main point of the Dialogue, however, they did not put it in a theoretical framework of perceptual objects. I attempt to show that the proposition is plausible only when one interprets it as an exploitation of the individuality of sense modalities, a topic present in current debates in philosophy of perception.
The chapter, even though not written by Gongsun Long, belongs to the tradition of the school of names, because it maintains its style in dispute, in which one argues against common knowledge. In the case of this chapter, the paradoxical impression of the Dialogue has been achieved by referring to proper objects of perception, which comprise a relatively small part of human daily perceptual experiences, instead of multimodal objects, which comprise most of human perceptual experiences.

Karsten Struhl, New School for Public Engagement

The Path of the Ecosattva

The ecological crisis is a fundamental existential crisis, because it poses the question of the survival of our species as well as the survival of many other species and ecosystems that now exist. It is also a spiritual crisis, because it poses the question of the relation of our species to the existence of other species and to the biosphere in general. In this talk, I will consider a number of ways in which Buddhism is positioned to address the spiritual and existential dimension of the ecological crisis.

However, I will also argue that the ecosattva path needs to go beyond early Buddhism, since early Buddhism is ambivalent about the value of nature as well as containing an anthropocentric dimension both in theory and in practice. I will further argue that the modern ecosattva path must supersede the ideal of the Bodhisattva while nonetheless drawing on its insights. Finally, I will consider the ways in which the ecosattva path cannot be fully realized by drawing on Buddhism alone, since it needs to develop an understanding of the social, political, and economic causes of the crisis; and I will conclude that twenty-first century ecosattvas need to join with other ecological radicals to develop a vision of and a prefigurative praxis for an ecosocialist society.

Kevin Taylor, University of Memphis

Make the Crooked Straight: Algorithmic Nudging and Classical Confucianism

I seek to re-visit Classical Confucian views of human nature with social media and algorithmic nudging as understood by Richard Thaler. A nudge, according to Thaler, is defined in such a way that is transparent and preserves autonomy. But is the definition of a nudge irrelevant and beyond Thaler and Sunstein’s original conception? I suggest that Kongzi and Mengzi remain relevant and that Xunzi’s arguments indeed help us understand the role of algorithmic nudging (that algorithms can appeal to the goodness of human nature by encouraging moral behavior). Nudging, according to Xunzi, can help “make the crooked straight” insofar as it functions as a ritual to reform virtuous, prosocial attitudes of everyday people and, borrowing from Mengzi’s Ox Mountain metaphor, prevent the clear cutting of the trees that are our virtues, allowing the better angels of human nature to continue to shine forth as opposed to algorithms such as Youtube videos that lead to ideological radicalization. In the end, Confucian views of human nature and good governance are considered in light of concept of the public and private sphere but with special attention paid to transparency of nudges ranging from obvious nudges (a text message from one’s health care provider reminding one to get a vaccine booster) to inconspicuous nudges (algorithms that determines ones news feed).
Melissa Townsend, Independent Scholar

The Yoga Sutras as Art – Philosophy as Practice

What does it mean to have a philosophical dialog and to engage deeply with a text through art? Is it possible to join the history of commentary on a philosophical text via art? I have been working with the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali via both translating the Sanskrit, (while studying the commentaries, history, and “sister” philosophy of Samkhya) and via painting them. I will be showing a selection of these paintings of the Yoga Sutras, and talking about the process, the results, and the value of using artistic models of performativity to disclose the meaning of the Yoga Sutras, and to engage with this important philosophical text as practice.

The dual process of engaging with the text both intellectually, via translating the Sanskrit and studying the commentaries and the underlying Samkhya philosophy, and in a non-linear, non-verbal, manner, via painting, allows for a rich and multidimensional presentation of the philosophy, and forces a philosophical dialog through art. Conventions in art and aesthetics, and references to the history of art, both of which in turn mirror cultural developments, become signifiers in a nuanced, multi-leveled presentation of and conversation about the Yoga Sutras.

One could think of philosophy – or any meaningful intellectual, creative, or spiritual pursuit – as an attempt to understand something profound and true about life – an attempt to understand what IS profound and true in life – while hoping to leave a trail of breadcrumbs for others to follow. Typically, in philosophy, we expect that “trail of breadcrumbs” to be in writing, following a long tradition of intellectual commentary. What if the “trail of breadcrumbs,” while still very much related to the philosophy, were to take a different form? How does one bring dimensionality to that breadcrumb trail? How does one use painting as a way to present the philosophy, and to have the same philosophy that informs the Yoga Sutras, inform works of art? That process will be the subject, of my talk, with the visual results of that work, a selection of the paintings, on view.

Kevin Turner, Hong Kong Baptist University

On the Use of Biology in Interpreting the Mengzi’s 孟子 Concept of Xing 性

The concept of xing 性 is one of the most important in the philosophy of the Mengzi 孟子. It is also one of the most debated concepts whose precise meaning is not yet agreed on by the academic community. There are different routes of interpretation that offer, at times, widely divergent and competing portraits of the concept of xing. Some scholars prefer to understand xing as “human nature” in the sense of a metaphysical or ontological substance while others prefer to adopt a biological approach or understanding. There is a certain tension between these two lines of interpretation that revolves around the idea of teleology. While there is no doubt that the Mengzi’s agricultural metaphors and other analogies seem to instantiate human morality in a physiological dimension, those who adopt the biology interpretation as means to distance themselves from the philosophically loaded metaphysical interpretation fail to do so because, as a hermeneutical framework, there is a hidden teleology that operates within modern biological thought that brings the biological interpretation of xing in line with
the metaphysical reading of xing despite any attempts to realize the reverse. This article is an attempt to analyze this tension and offer a possible interpretive solution.

**Yuki Ueda, The University of Tokyo**

*The life-mind continuity thesis and organicist philosophies: A comparative reading of Nishida and Whitehead*

The striking similarities between the metaphysical systems of Kitarō Nishida and Alfred North Whitehead have predominantly been taken up in the context of interfaith dialogue between Buddhism and Christianity. In this paper, I propose to approach the two thinkers not from religious perspectives but rather from the perspective of the philosophy of life. While both Nishida and Whitehead understand the active self-realization of living beings as a double-faced act of realizing possibilities and letting possibilities realize the beings themselves, the two diverge in critical ways in their views on the metaphysical source of the possibilities in question. Nishida takes the realm of possibilities to be pertaining to the self-realizing world as “dialectical universal,” whereas Whitehead claims that the “subjective aims” of living beings endow their respective “actual worlds” with possibilities for the beings to act on.

In order not to reduce this contrast to the matter of intricate jargons, I propose to spell it out in the terms of the contemporary dialogues between ecological psychology and enactivist approach to cognition, both of which embody different aspects of their central intuitions. I argue that Nishida and Whitehead work out different strategies to answer the much-discussed question of how to articulate the relationships between the possibilities that the environment “affords,” and the possibilities that a living organism “enacts” out of its self-regulative activities. The focal point of this question, it will be shown, lies in the nature of the spontaneity with which living beings explore the possibilities that are open to them. I suggest that Whitehead’s God can be interpreted as an ingenious tool to explain this spontaneity, while Nishida lacks a corresponding device. Through this comparative study, the paper aims to locate the phenomenon of life at the intersection of organism and environment, and the actual and the possible.

**Yidi Wu, Boston University**

*A Comparative Study of Aristotle and Mencius on Happiness and Virtue*

Aristotle and Mencius as important thinkers in the trajectory of ancient Greek and Chinese philosophies, share similar thoughts on happiness and its bearing on virtue. For Aristotle, happiness is a complete life in accordance with complete virtue. Compared to Aristotle who emphasizes the activity of soul in achieving happiness in Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Mencius seems to suggest to turn thoughts inwardly to seek happiness. As for Mencius, the true character of human nature is inclined to the good, so the task of moral cultivation should in accordance with human inclination. They both believe in the deepest potential of human beings to thrive and suggest that the proper way of human flourishing is the cultivation of virtue. In this paper, I attempt to show a nuanced understanding of both thinkers from a comparative perspective. I argue that happiness is attained by acting out one’s virtue for Aristotle in his
first definition of happiness (in Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics) while happiness is reached through thinking and self-cultivation for Mencius. However, the second definition of happiness by Aristotle in in Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics puts him closer to Mencius on the relationship between happiness and contemplation, as the former explicates the supreme virtue is understanding and the corresponding activity is study. Aristotle advocates that the contemplative or theoretical life leads to happiness. Still, study or philosophy is regarded by Aristotle as an activity. At any rate, Aristotle and Mencius would agree with each other virtue is the pillar of happiness. No matter through self-cultivation or study, virtue is required to the state of happiness. In conclusion, happiness and virtue are interrelated and intertwined. Happiness without virtue is not true happiness. Virtue is essential to happiness as its nourishment.

Kiene Brillenburg Wurth, Utrecht University

*Creativity beyond a self: an interthing perspective*

This paper focuses on perspectivism in the Zhuangzi en Dōgen in order to propose a decentered and posthuman approach to creativity. She critiques dominant notions of creativity in the global north centred on individuality, achievement, and technology and develops an ‘interthing’ critical framework that she derives from Daoist and Zen Buddhist thought. This framework is built on 4 intersecting concepts: impermanence, inter/intrarelationality, interdependent arising, and self/no-self. Focusing on the artist duo Heringa/Van Kalsbeek she explores co-creation within the bounds of this framework. More specifically, she explores how “things”, material, act and interact in the setting of—what Heringa/VanKalsbeek call—a controlled accident, a clearing for something to occur, in whatever way. Co/creative work, in this specific instance, boils down to the question: how to act on indeterminacy; how to move with nature—and: who/what acts? It boils down to an absorption of ‘self’ into the dynamism of matter.

Yat-Ching Yeung, Temple University

*The insufficiency of shaping Buddhist Ethics into the Western normative frameworks: A case study of “patience.”*

This paper argues that Buddhist ethics is a pragmatic self-transformation embedded in its metaphysics and epistemology, allowing flexibility in different existential problems beyond the scope of normative ethics. Jay Garfield describes Buddhist ethics as a moral phenomenology instead of any pre-existing normative frameworks such as deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics since collaborating with them drags one into the “one thought too many problem.” This paper puts forth that these normative templates are insufficient to explain Buddhist ethics.

This paper utilizes a consistent example of “patience,” one of the six paramitas drawn from Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvṛata, to show how those templates are insufficient. Doing so reinforces that moral phenomenology is a better alternative to depict Buddhist ethics concerning its pragmatic tendency on problem-solving alongside moderate particularism. Here, patience is an attitude to read irritating things as casual events and prevent generating further harmful causes for oneself and others. This account
suggests that Buddhist ethics is a pathway of experiencing oneself and others in the world, and focuses more on the inner aspect and input side of what we do in a non-egocentric way.

Reiterating Buddhist ethics as a self-cultivation, built upon how one perceives the world epistemologically; understands the world metaphysically; engages in the world ethically, without a self, is beneficial for insiders and outsiders to gain a deeper understanding of Buddhism in general. Significantly, showcasing the limitations of framing Buddhist ethics as any pre-existing form of Western ethics constructs a fairer picture to bridge meaningful conversation in cross-cultural philosophy.

Aizaiah Yong, Claremont School of Theology

*Ceasing to Be a Normal Person: A Panikkaran Spirituality for Multiracial People*

Raimon Panikkar is referred to as an “apostle of interfaith dialogue” and a “pilgrim across worlds.” Stemming from his own experience at the intersection of race, religion, and culture (being Catholic-Spaniard & Hindi-Indian), he sought to bear living witness to the “invisible harmony” of the One and the Many. He understood this integration to only take place by way of spirituality. Ultimately, Panikkar saw his vocation akin to a monk, “aspiring to reach the ultimate goal of all of life…” And in pursuing this, he described the experience as “feel[ing] at home in the East and the West, [being] a universal [person]; but the price of all of this is that [one] probably ceases to be a normal person.”

This “ceasing to be a normal person” might be contrasted with what multiracial psychologist, Kristen Renn, describes as “situational racial identity” wherein multiracial people adapt and alter their racial identification based on the context and circumstance. For Renn, this occurs when a person realizes the propensity for the category of race to reduce human experience and so responds by selecting what would be the best way to racially identify as to promote wholeness in the world. These dynamic psychological capabilities of multiracial people could also be likened to living in the nondual reality of the One and the Many amidst the present realities of race. The remaining question is how does a multiracial person develop capacities to attain these psychological states? This paper will investigate how a Panikkaran spirituality might deepen and expand pathways for multiracial people to embrace their own multidimensional experience as a sacred invitation to wholeness.

David Zoller, California Polytechnic State University

*Immanent transcendence: Nishida Kitarō’s basho and Husserl’s “determinable X”*

Nishida’s critiques of the phenomenological tradition have been accused more than once of missing their mark. While Nishida critiqued Husserl for failing to problematize self-consciousness, Husserl reportedly construed Nishida’s thought as a variant of his own. Nishida’s logic of “place” or basho (場所) tends to fit into the Nishida-Husserl dialogue at the level of the “absolute nothingness” (絶対無zettai mu) Nishida locates beneath Husserl’s notion of subjective consciousness, bridging consciousness and its world prior to their differentiation. Yet commentators debate whether Husserl needs this corrective. This paper
instead looks for Nishida’s uniqueness vis-à-vis Husserl in their respective accounts of the continuity and stability of objects.

Nishida’s concept of basho is recognized as being in part an answer to Aristotle’s puzzle about the inherence of multiple, even contrary, properties in a single object: whereas Aristotle resolves this with the concept of substance, Nishida puts forward a “logic of the predicate” where individuals are cognized only in relation to the “nothingness” of a predicate that does not itself appear (analogously as red and blue are distinct within the domain of “color”). While developing this idea in the mid-1920s, Nishida was aware that the German tradition of transcendental philosophy was disposed to resolve Aristotle’s puzzle by viewing the object as a limit of cognition that is aimed at, but not actually attained, across various cognitive efforts. Husserl refers to this stable, hidden core of the object as a “determinable x.” I discuss Nishida’s reasoning, especially in his 1924 “On Internal Perception,” for rejecting this style of solution to the problem of the continuity of objects. Nishida’s appeal instead to a predicative “nothingness” to address Aristotle’s question showcases Nishida’s unique place—and unique view of the objects of consciousness—vis-à-vis European transcendental philosophy, and in particular Husserl.

Jessica Zu, University of Southern California

*Karma and Structural (In)Justice: Buddhist Social Philosophy in Modern Asia*

This paper offers an initial analysis of social philosophies presented in works by Lü Cheng (1896–1989), Wang Enyang (1897–1964), Dharmananda Kosambi (1876–1947), B.R. Ambedkar (1896–1956), and Nalin Swaris (?–2011). In so doing, I hope to bridge two thus-far siloed fields of humanities, i.e., social philosophy and Buddhist modernism, and create a new conversation.

While a satisfactory treatment of these theories needs a separate in-depth analysis of karma as a Buddhist theory of agentless co-action, in this paper, I weave together three processual philosophical frameworks published in 2021 to suggest some useful vocabularies and effective bridge concepts that could best introduce these Buddhist social philosophies to the English-speaking academia: process social ontology (Jason Josephson Storm), philosophy of co-action (Mercedes Valmisa), Buddhist theory of copoiesis (Wendi Adamek).

The primary sources examined in this paper are: Lü Cheng Works in Buddhist Studies (1997), The Complete Works of Wang Enyang (1999), Dharmananda Kosambi’s “The Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha” (1910), “Ancient Indian Republics, the Buddhist Saṅgha, and Socialism” (1910), and Bodhisattva: A Play (1949), all in English translation; B. R. Ambedkar’s The Buddha and his Dhamma (1957); and Nalin Swaris’s The Buddha’s Way to Human Liberation: A Socio-Historical Approach (1997). In addition to their writings, I also examine the Pāli suttas and vinaya passages that they drew upon to theorize democracy as aggregated processes anchored by motivated, nonviolent, organizational co-action. Particularly important to this analysis are new interpretations of human agency as effects from processes of doing (e.g., enaction, practice, embodiment, and realization), karma as liberative praxis, and conditioned co-arising as copoietic processes.
In addition to articulating a new social philosophy that theorizes democratic civil society as motivated, nonviolent, organizational co-actions, this paper as contributes to the growing fields of history of democracy and philosophy of nonviolence.